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ABSTRACT
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial 
Reporting states that (GASB 1987, 27) "Financial 
reporting should assist in fulfilling government's duty 
to be publicly accountable and should enable users to 
assess that accountability." Government accountability 
requires that public officials answer to the citizenry. 
Further, accountability rests on the notion that the 
citizenry has a "right to know" (GASB 1987, 21) . 
Therefore, according to GASB Concepts Statement No. 1, 
municipal accounting data should reflect public resource 
allocation decisions made by government officials. This 
study investigates the usefulness of municipal 
accounting data for modeling a particular public 
resource allocation decision: the decision to privatize 
residential sanitation collection (RSC).
Data from Louisiana municipalities are used in this 
study. Inferential statistics are used to characterize 
the two groups of municipalities (those that privatize 
RSC and those that do not privatize RSC) in terms of 
demographic and financial variables. Public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy are used to suggest 
municipal accounting information that is useful for 
modeling the municipal decision to privatize RSC. 
Logistic regression (logit) analysis is employed to test
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whether municipal accounting data is useful for modeling 
the municipal decision to privatize RSC. The 
explanatory value of the overall model is evaluated 
using a chi-square statistic. Chi-square tests of the 
individual coefficients in the logit model are used to 
test the individual hypotheses. Five of the nine 
independent variables are statistically significant at 
the .10 level.
The major conclusion of this study is that public 
resource allocation decisions are impounded in the 
municipal accounting numbers. This finding makes it 
possible to assess the accountability of public 
officials by using municipal accounting data.
Furthermore, public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy provide the theoretical underpinnings 
necessary to develop models of public resource 
allocation decisions using municipal accounting data.
viii
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial 
Reporting states that (GASB 1987, 27): "Financial 
reporting should assist in fulfilling government's duty 
to be publicly accountable and should enable users to 
assess that accountability." Government accountability 
requires that public officials answer to the citizenry 
and rests on the notion that the citizenry has a "right 
to know" (GASB 1987, 21). Therefore, according to GASB 
Concept Statement No. 1, municipal financial records 
should reflect public resource allocation decisions made 
by government officials. The ability of municipal 
accounting data to reflect public resource allocation 
decisions has not received much attention in the 
accounting literature. This study investigates the 
usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling a 
particular public resource allocation decision: the 
decision to privatize residential sanitation collection 
(RSC).
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RSC is one of the most important public services a 
municipal government provides to its residents and the 
cost of this service is not inconsequential. Depending 
on the range of services offered, a local government may 
devote as much as 3 0% of its budget to RSC (Savas 1979, 
25). Municipal residents pay for RSC via personal taxes 
(e.g., property taxes, general sales taxes) or user fees 
based upon the cost of the service. Regardless of the 
financing arrangement, city residents bear the cost.
While municipalities generally provide (i.e., 
finance) RSC, they do not necessarily engage in the 
actual production of the service. That is, a 
municipality has a choice regarding who actually 
performs RSC. Two alternatives to using municipal 
employees for RSC are: (1) contracting with a private 
sector firm, and (2) contracting with another 
governmental unit (e.g., city, county).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling the 
municipal decision to privatize RSC. Privatization, as 
used in this study, refers to the contracting out of a 
municipal service to a private sector firm. This 
definition of privatization implies that the production 
of a service is turned over to a private sector firm 
while financing remains the responsibility of the 
municipality. Throughout this study privatized RSC and
contract RSC are used interchangeably and refer to an 
arrangement whereby RSC is carried out by a private 
sector firm under contract with a municipality.
RSC is the focus of this study for three reasons:
(1) the importance of RSC to city residents, (2) the 
widespread proliferation of privatized RSC, and (3) the 
existing body of literature concerning the privatization 
of RSC provides a solid foundation on which to build. 
Each of these reasons is discussed below.
Millar (1983, 191) summarizes the importance of
RSC:
Residential solid waste collection is one of the 
most basic of all municipal services. It is 
estimated that American households alone discard [a 
lot] of solid waste each year and all of it needs 
to be collected.
Given the magnitude of the problem, it is not 
surprising that residential solid waste collection 
is an important issue for every city.
The highly visible effect of RSC on the appearance of a
community and its impact on public health combine to
create concern among local government officials (Savas
1979, 25).
While many public services are privatized in the 
United States, some services possess qualities which 
increase their attractiveness to private sector firms.
A partial listing of services that are often privatized 
includes: airports, data processing, fleet or vehicle 
maintenance, hospitals, parking lots or garages, public 
safety or corrections, RSC or disposal, transit or
transportation, utilities, and vehicle towing or 
storage. RSC is a likely candidate for privatization 
because the necessary inputs to production are abundant 
in the economy (e.g., unskilled labor and specific 
capital). Also, the costs for private sector firms to 
enter into (and exit from) the RSC market are relatively 
low. This propensity for private sector firms to enter 
into the RSC market is apparent from the results of a 
1987 survey of privatization in America, sponsored by 
Touche Ross (now Deloitte Touche), the International 
City Management Association (ICMA), and the 
Privatization Council:
. . . the services most frequently contracted 
out in the last five years have been solid-waste 
collection or disposal (nearly 60%) , vehicle towing 
or storage (45%), and building or grounds 
maintenance and service (nearly 45%) (David 1988, 
47) .
According to David (1988, 47), these same services are 
expected to remain among the most frequently privatized.
Finally, there exists a substantial volume of prior 
research regarding the privatization of RSC. Most 
empirical studies compare the cost of contract RSC with 
the cost of municipal RSC. The majority of these 
studies find that municipal RSC is more costly than 
contract RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978; 
Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; Berenyi and 
Stevens 1988). If this is true, one must wonder why so 
many municipalities use municipal employees for RSC.
This particular issue has not received much attention in 
the literature. The present study provides some 
insights as to the determinants of the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC.
Millar (1983) identifies the following methods of 
RSC as the five most popular RSC arrangements in use in 
the United States:
1. Municipal— RSC is carried out by municipal 
employees.
2. Contract— RSC is carried out by a private 
sector firm under contract with the local 
government.
3. Franchise— RSC is carried out by a private 
sector firm that is awarded the exclusive 
right to operate in a specific area by the 
local government. Under this arrangement the 
firm is paid directly by the individual 
citizens.
4. Private— RSC is carried out by a private 
sector firm hired and paid directly by its 
customers (the citizens). The firm does not 
have exclusive rights, therefore, several 
firms may engage in RSC in the same geographic 
area.
5. Self-Service— each household delivers its own 
refuse to a disposal site or transfer station.
The data for the present study is drawn from the 
State of Louisiana which has 301 municipalities. 
Louisiana is dominated by small municipalities 
(population less than 10,000). This is a significant 
feature of the data because of the limited amount of 
prior research regarding small governmental units.1
Privatization of municipal services is a topic that 
concerns public officials, public employees, citizens, 
and scholars. Each of these groups has an interest in a 
decision regarding the privatization of municipal 
services. The cost of privatization in economic as well 
as political terms is important to public officials. 
Public employees fear they will lose their jobs because 
of privatization. Citizens are interested in the impact 
of privatization on the taxes they pay as well as the 
quality of services they receive. Finally, scholars 
seek to understand the economic and political impact of 
privatization, as well as the factors that influence the 
decision to privatize.
Most academic research regarding privatization is 
published in the fields of economics, political science, 
and public administration. One line of research 
compares the cost of private sector service delivery to 
the cost of public sector service delivery, showing that
Stallings and Ferris (1988) find that between 1940 
and 1984 less than 24% of the papers in Public 
Administration Review focus on local government.
private sector service delivery is less costly than 
public sector service delivery (e.g., Deacon 1979, 
McGuire and Van Cott 1984, Ferris 1988). A second area 
of research utilizes the tools of economics to 
investigate the political forces that drive political 
decision making (e.g., McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott 
1987). This second area of research is within the realm 
of public choice theory. The present study employs the 
public choice approach.
Theoretical Framework
The decision to privatize RSC is a public resource 
allocation decision. Decisions regarding the allocation 
of public resources are made via the political process. 
The political process is a complex set of interactions 
between voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. To 
understand the decisions resulting from this complex set 
of interactions a comprehensive theoretical framework is 
necessary to model the behavior of voters, politicians, 
and bureaucrats. Public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy provide the foundation for such a 
theoretical framework.
Public choice theory maintains that in a democracy, 
such as the United States, voters decide how public 
funds are expended. In a representative democracy, 
voters elect public officials on the assumption that, 
once elected, the official will make decisions that are
in the best interest of the citizenry. The median voter 
model (Hotelling 1929; Bowen 1943; Downs 1957) is the 
dominant theoretical framework for investigating 
government spending. The median voter model is based on 
the premise that in a simple majority rule election the 
voter with the median preferences is the deciding vote. 
Therefore, politicians will seek the support of the 
median voter. According to the median voter theorem, 
the allocation of public resources coincides with the 
preferences of the median voter.
The theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971) maintains 
that bureaucrats are utility maximizers that do not rely 
on votes to remain in their jobs. Because they are 
isolated from the voting mechanism, bureaucrats are able 
to allocate public resources such that their personal 
utility is maximized. Therefore, to understand 
bureaucratic decision making, the arguments of a 
bureaucrat’s utility function must be known. According 
to Niskanen (1971) one of the arguments in the utility 
function of a bureaucrat is the size of his or her 
budget. Accordingly, a bureaucrat attempts to maximize 
his or her budget.
Bureaucrats serve under elected politicians. 
Therefore, bureaucrats can only act as self-interested 
utility maximizers so long as they do not jeopardize the 
political careers of the politicians they serve. The
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present study synthesizes public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy into an unified theoretical 
framework to analyze the municipal decision to privatize 
RSC. In this framework, bureaucrats are utility 
maximizers constrained by the political process and 
voters are rationally ignorant regarding political 
issues. That is, voters only become politically active 
when the benefits of political activity exceed the costs 
of becoming politically active (Downs 1957). The 
rational ignorance of voters implies that there is a 
range of government activity within which voters are 
apathetic. This range is referred to herein as the 
"range of voter indifference." According to this 
framework, a bureaucrat seeks to maximize personal 
utility, disregarding the best interests of the 
citizenry, within the range of voter indifference.
Outside of the range of voter indifference, voters 
mobilize and react to political events, forcing 
bureaucrats to implement policies more consistent with 
their desires. Tax increases beyond some threshold 
level and the perception of excessive waste in 
government are two issues that typically mobilize voters 
into action. The range of voter indifference provides 
some insight as to why some observed public resource 
allocation decisions are not always necessarily in the 
best interest of the citizenry.
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Research Question
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less 
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; 
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; 
Berenyi and Stevens 1988). However, there are many 
municipalities that do not use contract RSC. Therefore, 
decision makers in the public sector (i.e., bureaucrats) 
are not minimizing costs. Niskanen (1971) provides a 
theoretical rationale (i.e., the theory of bureaucracy) 
for the lack of cost minimizing behavior on the part of 
bureaucrats. Public choice theory provides a framework 
for predicting the actions of voters and politicians. 
Together, public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy provide the foundation for a comprehensive 
theory of public resource allocation decisions. The 
present study combines public choice theory with the 
theory of bureaucracy to investigate the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. The principal research 
question is:
Is municipal accounting data useful for modeling
the municipal decision to privatize RSC?
Hypotheses derived from public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy are used to investigate this 
research question. Municipal accounting data are used 
to operationalize the hypotheses.
Municipal accounting data is a written, historical, 
and verifiable record of public resource allocation 
decisions. Prior research suggests that municipal 
accounting data is useful in explaining voter behavior 
since it measures the effects of policy decisions 
consistent with voter assessment (Ingram and Copeland 
1981, 830). The present study is a response to a call 
for additional research regarding the usefulness of 
municipal accounting information (Ingram and Copeland 
1981, 841).
Method
A survey of Louisiana municipalities is used to 
obtain data for this study. The survey ascertains the 
method of RSC, the cost of RSC, as well as other data 
necessary for the study. Inferential statistics are 
used to characterize the two groups of municipalities 
(those that privatize RSC and those that do not 
privatize RSC) in terms of demographic and financial 
variables. Public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy are used to guide the selection of municipal 
accounting data useful for modeling the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Logistic regression (logit) 
analysis is employed to test the extent to which 
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the 
municipal decision to privatize RSC. Multicollinearity 
among the independent variables in a logit model can
make the interpretation of the individual coefficients 
difficult. Therefore, the independent variables are 
examined for evidence of multicollinearity. The 
explanatory value of the model is evaluated using a 
chi-square statistic. Chi-square tests of the 
individual coefficients in the logit model are used to 
test the individual hypotheses.
Contributions of the Study 
The GASB Concepts Statement No. 1, ''Objectives of 
Financial Reporting," implies that governmental 
financial reports should reflect public resource 
allocation decisions (GASB 1987). This study 
demonstrates the use of municipal accounting data for 
modeling a particular public resource allocation 
decision: the decision to privatize RSC. Public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy guide the selection 
of municipal accounting data to operationalize the 
determinants of the decision to privatize RSC. While 
the decision to privatize RSC is a specific public 
resource allocation decision, this study illustrates how 
a theoretical framework which incorporates public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy can be used to 
suggest municipal accounting data useful for modeling 
other public resource allocation decisions. Thus, this 
study strengthens the link between municipal accounting
data, public choice theory, and the theory of 
bureaucracy.
This study synthesizes public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy into an unified theory of 
constrained bureaucratic decision making. That is, a 
formal framework is presented which models bureaucratic 
decision making that is constrained by the political 
process (i.e., voters and politicians). While the 
specific decision of privatization of RSC is the focus 
of this study, the theoretical framework should be 
useful for investigating other public resource 
allocation decisions.
The decision regarding how municipal services are 
delivered is a public resource allocation decision.
Once the decision to provide a public service is made, 
the mode of service delivery must be considered. This 
study investigates two modes of RSC: municipal— -where 
RSC is carried out by municipal employees, and 
contract— where RSC is carried out by a private sector 
firm under contract with a municipality.
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less 
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; 
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; 
Berenyi and Stevens 1988). However, prior research uses 
data from municipalities with populations greater than 
10,000. This study uses data from Louisiana
municipalities, the majority of which are small 
(population less than 10,000). Therefore, this study 
extends the current body of literature by providing 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of privatization 
on the cost of RSC in small municipalities.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Census (1989,
285), 88% of all municipal governments serve less than
10,000 people; 94% of all township governments serve 
less than 10,000 people; and 23% of all county 
governments serve less than 10,000 people. However, in 
an examination of articles appearing in Public 
Administration Review between 1940 and 1984, Stallings 
and Ferris (1988, 583) find a rather small percentage 
(less than 24%) of papers concerning local government. 
The majority of articles focus on the federal 
government, while state government appears to be a 
popular topic during the decade of the 1950s. Cornia 
and Usher (1981, 74-75) also allude to the lack of 
research regarding local governments. They point out 
that most budgeting research deals with state and 
federal government and results are often generalized to 
the local level. Such generalizations, however, may not 
be appropriate because of institutional differences that 
exist between local governments and federal/state 
governments (Cornia and Usher 1981, 75). For example, 
unlike local governments, the federal government is not
required to submit a balanced budget (Cornia and Usher 
1981, 75). The present study contributes to the 
existing body of literature by providing empirical 
evidence regarding the determinants of the decision to 
privatize RSC by small municipalities (i.e., 
municipalities serving less than 10,000 people).
Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the study. 
GASB Concept Statement No. 1 is presented as the 
motivation for the study. Public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy are presented as the building 
blocks of a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
investigating the usefulness of municipal accounting 
data for modeling public resource allocation decisions. 
The research question and research method are described. 
The contributions of the study are also discussed. The 
remaining chapters present a review of the literature 
relevant to the study, a formal presentation of the 
theoretical framework, a detailed description of the 
research method, an analysis of the data, and the 
conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
literature relevant to the present study. The 
literature is separated into four sections. The first 
section reviews studies regarding the efficiency of 
public sector vs. private sector production of 
government services. The second section analyzes 
research that investigates the determinants of the 
privatization decision. The third section discusses 
public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy. The 
fourth section reviews studies that use logit or probit 
to investigate the determinants of accounting choices.
Efficiency of Public Versus 
Private Production
Many studies document the efficiency of private 
sector production over public sector production.2 
Generally, three reasons account for the efficiency of 
private sector production. First, competition in the
2 For example, Ahlbrandt (1973) investigates fire 
protection; Kitchen (1976), Savas (1977), Stevens (1978), 
Bennett & Johnson (1979), McDavid (1985), and Berenyi & 
Stevens (1988) all investigate refuse collection; and 
McGuire & Van Cott (1984) investigate school bus 
transportation.
16
production of services tends to drive costs down since 
the marketplace forces high priced, inefficient firms 
out of business. Second, private sector firms can take 
advantage of scale economies since they are not 
constrained by geographical boundaries. Therefore, 
private sector firms can choose an optimal size or scale 
of operation— a choice typically unavailable to 
municipalities (Spann 1977, 89). Finally, the incentive 
structure for the manager of a private sector enterprise 
is more conducive to efficient production than the 
incentive structure of the public bureaucracy (Spann 
1977, 89). This is true because many private sector 
enterprises offer salaries that can be increased via 
efficient production such as a bonus plan based on net 
income. However, municipal managers rarely have such 
bonus plans to provide an incentive to operate 
efficiently.
Kitchen
Kitchen (1976) uses data from 48 Canadian 
municipalities (all with populations in excess of 
10,000) to study the factors affecting the average unit 
cost of refuse collection. The results suggest that 
refuse collection costs increase: (1) when the site of 
collection is at the rear of a dwelling, (2) as annual 
snowfall increases, (3) as weekly labor cost per truck 
increase, and (4) as population density increases. On
the contrary, refuse collection costs decrease: (1) when 
specialized collection vehicles are used, (2) as the 
number of persons per household increase, (3) as the 
proportion of residential only collection increases, and 
(4) when contract collection is used rather than 
municipal collection (Kitchen 1976, 72).
Savas
Savas (1977) reports the results of a study of the 
prevalence and comparative efficiency of municipal vs. 
contract RSC for cities with populations between 2,500 
and 750,000. In this study, efficiency is defined as 
cost per household. This definition of efficiency 
eliminates the need to obtain cost information from 
contract firms. Instead, only the prices they charge 
(which include profits) are necessary (Savas 1977, 58) .
The findings indicate that municipal and contract 
RSC account for 4 6.9% of the 2,531 cities in the study, 
with municipal RSC being almost twice as popular as 
contract RSC (30.3% and 16.6% respectively). Other 
arrangements such as franchise, private, and self- 
service account for the remainder of the cities in the 
study. The results also indicate that for cities with a 
population in excess of 50,000, contract RSC is more 
efficient (i.e., cost less per household) than municipal 
RSC. However, for cities with populations between 2,500 
and 20,000, there are no significant differences between
the cost of municipal RSC and contract RSC. According 
to Savas (1977, 73-74), some of the policy implications 
of these results are: (1) cities with less than 20,000 
residents may be able to lower there RSC cost per 
household by forming larger markets of up to 50,000 in 
population, and contracting out RSC to "a single 
organization— public or private" (Savas 1977, 73); (2) 
cities with 50,000 to 100,000 residents may 
significantly lower the cost of RSC per household by 
contracting with a private sector firm; and (3) the best 
approach for cities in excess of 100,000 residents is to 
divide up the city into several districts and have one 
or more of the districts serviced by a municipal agency 
while the other districts are contracted out to one or 
more private sector firms.
The Savas (1977) study uses 1970 Census data, and 
includes only those U.S. cities with populations in 
excess of 2,500 that are within a 11. . . Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) lying entirely 
within a single state and having a total population of 
less than 1,500,000" (Savas 1977, 54). The size of the 
cities in the Savas (1977) study range from 2,500 to
750,000 in population.
The present study uses more recent data, and 
includes all municipalities within a single state 
(Louisiana). The size of the municipalities in the
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present study range from 430 to 556,913 in population.
Since many of the municipalities in Louisiana are very 
small (population less than 2,500) a comparison of the 
cost of municipal RSC and contract RSC for very small 
communities is possible. Data from a single state 
excludes some of the confounding factors present when 
using data from many different states.
Stevens
Stevens (1978) examines the effect of market 
structure, degree of competition, and market size on the 
cost of RSC. Three market structures are investigated:
(1) private monopoly, in which RSC is carried out by a 
private sector firm under contract with a municipality;
(2) public monopoly, in which RSC is carried out by a 
public agency; and (3) competitive, in which RSC is 
performed by several different organizations (e.g., 
private sector firm, public agency, etc). The dependent 
variable in this study is total cost to households 
served. An ordinary least squares regression is used to 
determine whether market structure impacts on the ratio 
of total costs to households served. Market size and 
service level are held constant in the analysis.
The data for this study is from 340 cities 
throughout the Unites States. The populations of these 
cities range from 2,500 to over 700,000. For cities 
with populations less than 50,000, Stevens (1978) finds
no significant difference in the cost of RSC when 
comparing the private monopoly arrangement to the public 
monopoly arrangement. However, for cities with 
populations greater than 50,000, the public monopoly 
arrangement is significantly more costly than the 
private monopoly arrangement. Stevens (1978, 447) 
concludes that the cost differences are due to different 
management and production techniques for the two 
arrangements. In support of this conclusion, Stevens
(1978) finds that private monopolist are more likely to 
use smaller work crews, larger collection vehicles, and 
vehicles that can be loaded from the front or side 
rather than the rear. Also, absenteeism is 
significantly lower for private monopolist. These 
findings suggest that private monopolist are superior to 
public monopolist (i.e., bureaucrats) with respect to 
minimizing costs.
Bennett and Johnson
Bennett and Johnson (1979) compare the cost of 
county RSC to the cost of private RSC. The fees charged 
by private RSC firms operating in Fairfax County, 
Virginia are compared to the fees charged by the Fairfax 
County Solid Waste Division of Public Works. The
approximately one-third of the homes in Fairfax County. 
The remaining homes contract individually with one of
Fairfax (iounty Solid Waste Division services
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the 29 private sector firms that operate in the area 
(Bennett and Johnson 1979, 58-59).
A t-test finds that private RSC is significantly 
less costly than county RSC. Bennett and Johnson (1979) 
footnote the fact that the county services an area that 
is further from the sanitary landfill than the area 
serviced by the private sector firms. This geographical 
difference confounds their t-test results since the cost 
of traveling this additional distance automatically 
increases the county's RSC costs. This factor is not 
taken into account by a simple t-test.
McDavid
McDavid (1985) reports the results of a study of 
privatization in the RSC industry in Canada. A 
questionnaire mailed to all Canadian cities excepting 
Quebec with 1976 populations in excess of 10,000 is used 
to collect data for this study. McDavid (1985) obtains 
a 61.5% response rate.
Three institutional arrangements dominate Canadian 
cities: (1) municipal— in which public employees are 
responsible for RSC; (2) contract— in which private 
sector firms under contract with a municipality are 
responsible for RSC; and (3) mixed— in which most RSC is 
the responsibility of municipal employees while private 
sector firms under contract with the municipality are 
responsible for the remaining RSC.
McDavid (1985) finds that municipal RSC is the most 
expensive arrangement ($42.29 per household), while 
contract RSC is the least expensive ($28.02 per 
household) arrangement. The cost of municipal RSC in 
mixed systems ($31.31) is more costly than a strictly 
contract arrangement, but less costly than a strictly 
municipal arrangement. According to McDavid (1985,
604), the difference between the cost of municipal RSC 
and contract RSC is due to.managerial differences. 
McDavid (1985) finds that private sector firms use 
smaller work crews, larger capacity vehicles, and pay 
lower wages.
The McDavid (1985) study suggests that private 
sector firms are superior to municipal agencies with 
respect to minimizing costs. The results also indicate 
that competition forces all producers (both public 
sector and private sector) to minimize costs. The 
absence of competition under the strictly municipal 
arrangement apparently provides an environment in which 
minimizing costs is not necessary.
McDavid (1985) also investigates the effect of 
privatization on the cost of RSC for two individual 
Canadian municipalities. The analyses indicate that 
privatization results in substantial savings. However, 
since only two cities are analyzed these results must be 
viewed as antidotal. Valid statistical inferences are
possible only when data from many observations are 
examined.
Berenyi and Stevens
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) compare contract service 
delivery with municipal service delivery for eight local 
services (one of which is RSC). The analyses focus on 
differences in the cost of providing the service, and 
the quality of the service, as well as, the reasons for 
any observed cost differences. Data for this study 
include cities in the Los Angeles Standard Consolidated 
Statistical Area with populations between 10,000 and 
250,000.
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) find that contracting is 
less costly for all eight of the services investigated. 
The difference is statistically significant for six of 
the services. Municipal RSC is significantly more 
costly than contract RSC (a = .05). The results also 
indicate that differences in the quality of service are 
not statistically significant. Berenyi and Stevens 
(1988, 17) conclude that the lower costs associated with 
contract RSC (in comparison to municipal RSC) are 
probably due to differences in management and personnel 
policies.
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) find that private sector 
organizations make use of incentive systems more often 
and have fewer levels of management between program
directors and direct labor workers (a = .05). In 
addition, private sector organizations: (1) are more 
likely to grant managers the authority to hire and fire 
workers, (2) have lower absentee rates, (4) offer fewer 
vacation days per worker, (5) utilize younger (less 
tenured) workers, (6) have a smaller percentage of 
workers that are unionized, and (7) have ratios of 
fringe benefits to total salaries and wages that tend to 
be lower than public sector organizations (all 
significant at the .01 level). These finding support 
the notion that private sector organizations are managed 
differently than public sector organizations.
Deacon
Deacon (1979), in a study of 64 cities in Los 
Angeles county, finds that cities that purchase services 
from county or private sector vendors spend 
significantly less than cities that choose to produce 
their own services. Deacon classifies cities as either 
"producing" or "purchasing" according to the percentage 
of budgeted outlays contracted out. This partitioning 
scheme was developed by Sonenblum et al. (1975)3. Most 
"purchasing" cities in the Deacon (1979) study contract
3In the Sonenblum et al. (1975) study, cities that 
contract out less than 10% of their budgeted outlays are 
labeled self-provision (i.e., producing) cities, while 
those that contract out more than 10% of their budgeted 
outlays are labeled contracting (i.e., purchasing) cities.
out more than 20 percent of their budgeted outlays, 
while none of the "producing" cities contract out more 
than 3 percent.
Deacon (1979) re-specifies a public expenditure 
model based on the median voter theorem (Barr and Davis, 
1966; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; and Bergstrom and 
Goodman, 1973) to allow for the possibility of 
bureaucratic influences. This is accomplished by 
including a dichotomous variable where a value of 1 
indicates a purchasing city. Expenditure equations are 
estimated for three cost categories: total expenditures, 
police protection, and street maintenance. The results 
indicate that purchasing municipalities spend about 86 
percent as much for total expenditures as their 
producing counterparts. Figures for police protection 
and street maintenance are 58 percent and 70 percent 
respectively (Deacon 1979, 388).
McGuire and Van Cott
In a study of the effects of public sector versus 
private sector school bus operation, McGuire and Van 
Cott (1984) find that private sector school bus 
operation is less costly than public operation. This 
study is an extension of the prior research of Bails
(1979). McGuire and Van Cott (1984) employ a different 
data set to correct problems inherent in the data used 
by Bails (1979).
Bails (1979) compares transportation costs at the 
county level across six states. The states are divided 
into two groups: (1) public sector ownership and (2) 
private sector ownership. The problems inherent in this 
classification scheme are twofold. First, public 
ownership exists in varying degrees in the states 
classified as public, while private sector ownership 
exists in varying degrees in the states classified as 
private. Second, public accounting procedures, 
regulatory practices, climate, and topographical 
conditions are not consistent across the states. These 
conditions introduce extraneous, confounding factors 
into the analysis.
McGuire and Van Cott (1984) restrict their study to 
the state of Indiana to avoid problems inherent in 
interstate comparisons. The data for the McGuire and 
Van Cott (1984) study includes 275 school districts. Of 
these, 144 provide transportation with district-owned 
(public) buses; 49 school districts use the services of 
private sector contractors; and 82 districts use both 
district-owned and contractor-owned buses. Opportunity 
costs, not available in the accounting records (e.g., 
foregone interest income associated with district 
ownership, economic depreciation rather than accounting 
depreciation, and registration fees implicit in district
ownership), are estimated and included in the cost of 
providing transportation via district-owned buses.
McGuire and Van Cott (1984) find that the cost per 
mile is higher for public bus systems in 12 of 15 
comparisons. In five of these comparisons the 
difference is statistically significant. The cost per 
trip is higher for public bus systems in 11 of 15 
comparisons. In six of these comparisons the difference 
is statistically significant.
Ferris
Ferris (1988) investigates the effects of local 
service contracting on public spending and employment. 
Ferris (1988) merges four sources of data:
(1) Cross-sectional data from the 1982 
International City Management Association 
(ICMA) survey on local supply arrangements,
(2) County and City Data Book of 1982,
(3) The Annual Survey of Governments: Finance and 
Employment Statistics 1981, and
(4) Moodys' Municipal and Government Manual 1982.
A sample of 500 cities with populations of 25,000
or more is used in this study. The results indicate 
that as the percent of public services produced 
externally increases, general expenditures, total 
expenditures, and public employment all decrease. These 
results suggest that external (private sector)
production is less costly than internal (public sector) 
production.
All of the above studies suggest that public sector 
production is more costly than private sector 
production. Therefore, municipalities that do not 
privatize RSC are spending more public resources than 
would be spent if RSC was contracted out to a private 
sector firm. The present study investigates the 
determinants of the decision to privatize RSC.
The Determinants of Privatization
This section reviews three studies that investigate 
the determinants of privatization. These studies 
provide a foundation for the present study. The present 
study extends prior research by using public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971) to 
guide the selection of municipal accounting data useful 
for modeling the municipal decision to privatize RSC.
Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries
Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries, (1977) investigate 
cities in Los Angeles county to determine why cities 
contract out services, how contracting affects tax 
rates, and how contracting and its effects on tax rates 
affect the level and composition of expenditures. In 
their study, a sample of 72 cities in Los Angeles County 
are partitioned into two groups based on the percentage
of budgeted outlays contracted out. Municipalities are 
labeled "self-provision"1 cities if they contract out 
less than 10 percent of their city budget. Forty-four 
cities are considered self-provision cities. The 
remaining 28 cities contract out between 10 and 100 
percent of their budgeted outlays and are labeled 
"contracting cities." The results suggest that 
contracting cities have a smaller tax base and spend 
less on municipal services than self-provision cities.
The researchers use a system of multiple regression 
equations in which independent variables are entered in 
a recursive fashion (Sonenblum et al. 1977, 117). The 
model uses a three stage process as follows:
Step I: Contracting = (community
characteristics, tax bases)
Step II: Tax Rates = F2 (community
characteristics, tax bases, contracting)
Step III: Expend = F3 (community characteristics,
tax bases, contracting, tax rates)
The results of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries 
(1977) study suggest that the extent of contracting out 
is determined by trade-offs between the desire to: (1) 
maintain control over service delivery, (2) keep 
expenditures low, and (3) minimize the tax burden on 
property owners. Specifically, the findings suggest 
that the degree of contracting out increases as the 
desire to maintain local control decreases. However, 
regardless of the preference for local control,
declining commercial sales within a municipality tend to 
increase the degree of contracting out. Therefore, the 
tax base variable dominates the local control variable. 
An increase in the incidence of contracting is also 
associated with an increase in the property base per 
capita and a decrease in family incomes.
Another conclusion of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and 
Ries (1977) study is that contracting is associated with 
lower property tax rates and lower property taxes per 
capita. However, contracting is also associated with 
the use of special districts. A special district is a 
special purpose governmental unit set up to administer a 
specific local function. Special districts may be 
independent special purpose governmental units created 
under state law or they may be component units of 
county, city, or other general governmental units (Hay 
1989). When special district tax rates are explicitly 
considered, the overall average municipal service tax 
rate of contracting cities is identical to that of self- 
provision cities (Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries 1977, 132). 
Therefore, when considering the effect of contracting on 
property tax rates, it is important to account for the 
use of special districts (and hence special district 
taxes). Failure to do so may result in the misleading 
conclusion that contracting reduces the overall tax 
burden of the citizen.
The conclusions of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries 
(1977) study must be interpreted with caution. 
Specifically, the contracting, tax rate, and expenditure 
variables are all endogenous. Therefore, the estimation 
procedure used yields unreliable (i.e., biased and 
inconsistent) estimates. A simultaneous-equation model 
(e.g., three-stage least squares4) should be used to 
take into account the codetermination of tax rates, 
expenditures, and the propensity to contract out.
Ferris
Ferris (1986) examines the determinants of 
privatization in cities across the United States. This 
study uses cross-sectional data from the 1982 ICMA 
Survey of Alternative Approaches for Delivering 
Services; the 1983 County and City Data Book; the Survey 
of Governments: Finance Statistics, 1981; and the 
Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations 
Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1982-83.
Because of the unavailability of data for cities with 
populations of less than 25,000, a data set consisting 
of 477 cities with populations of at least 25,000 is 
used. Three sets of factors are used to model the 
decision to contract out:
4 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981 Econometric Models 
and Economic Forecasts New York: McGraw-Hill Company (pp. 
334-338) for a discussion of the three-stage least squares 
technique.
33
. . . the potential for reducing the costs of 
producing services, the fiscal pressures to reduce 
the costs of producing services, and the political 
inducements and obstacles to contracting out 
(Ferris 1986, 291).
Specifically, Ferris (1986, 291) states that contracting
out is more likely as (1) potential cost savings
increase, (2) the incentive to reduce costs increase,
and (3) political opposition to contracting becomes
weaker. Based on this conceptual model, the following
equation is estimated:
CONTRACT = a + biSUPPLYi + bjFISCALj + bkPOLITICALk
where CONTRACT is the percentage of services provided by 
the city that are produced externally; SUPPLY is a 
vector of variables related to the costs of production 
and the supply of external producers; FISCAL is a vector 
of variables that characterize the fiscal environment of 
the city; and POLITICAL is a vector of political forces 
that influence the contracting out decision.
The results of the Ferris (1986) study suggest that 
a city is more likely to privatize when private sector 
salaries are lower than the salaries paid to city 
employees. Also, large cities are more likely to 
privatize than small (population between 25,000 and 
50,000) cities. With respect to the political 
variables, the results suggest that privatization is 
less likely as: (1) the percent of the population that
is 65 years of age or older increases, (2) as the 
percent of households with incomes of $30,000 or less 
increases, and (3) as the number of city employees per 
100 residents increases.
With respect to the fiscal variables, cities with 
relatively high tax burdens contract out more often.
The evidence also suggests that as the percentage of 
city revenues received from federal and state grants 
increase, the percentage of services contracted out to 
private sector firms increases. This result is opposite 
the a priori expectation. Ferris (1986) notes that 
reliance on intergovernmental revenues may be a proxy 
for limited fiscal capacity since many grant programs 
are based on community need. Ferris (1986) also finds 
that municipalities operating under an overall tax rate 
limit are more likely to privatize. All fiscal 
variables are significant. Therefore, variables 
regarding the financial status of a municipality are 
important in modeling the municipal decision to 
privatize RSC.
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott
Using cross-sectional data from the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia for the 1979-80 school year, 
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott, (1987) investigate why 
some governmental units choose to provide public 
services with publicly owned and operated production
units, whereas other governmental units choose to 
provide the same service via contracts with private 
sector firms. Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy 
is employed to develop a model of the decision to 
contract out school bus transportation in the United 
States. Niskanen's (1971) theory views bureaucratic 
decisions as a function of a bureaucrat's attempt to 
maximize personal utility. The results of the McGuire, 
Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) study support the theory 
that bureaucrats behave as utility maximizers.
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) conclude that 
contracting with private sector firms is more attractive 
as (1) the degree of labor unionization in the public 
sector increases relative to the private sector, (2) 
strike activity in the public sector increases relative 
to the private sector, and (3) public sector wage rates 
increase relative to private-sector wage rates.
A bureaucrat behaving as a utility maximizer will 
opt for the mode of service delivery that is less 
problematic. Unionization and strike activity are two 
issues that a utility maximizing bureaucrat tries to 
avoid. Therefore, as unionization and strike activity 
in the public sector increase, a utility maximizing 
bureaucrat is more likely to use privatization as a 
method of avoiding these issues. The third conclusion 
is less consistent with Niskanen's (1971) theory.
Budget maximizing bureaucrats are not necessarily 
concerned with the fact that private sector wages are 
lower than public sector wages. However, elected 
officials desiring to remain in office are concerned 
with the perception of excessive waste in government.
If public sector wages are relatively higher than 
private sector wages, some voter groups may pressure 
elected officials to be more efficient. Elected 
officials must then respond by either (1) reducing 
public sector employee wages or (2) privatizing services 
to take advantage of the lower costs of production in 
the private sector.
The theory of bureaucracy guides the McGuire, 
Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) study. However, the 
variables are primarily of a socioeconomic nature. The 
present study employs both public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy to suggest independent variables 
of a financial nature to model the municipal decision to 
privatize RSC.
Public Choice Theory
The decision to privatize public services is a 
public resource allocation decision. Two institutional 
arrangements dominate democratic societies for making 
such decisions: (1) direct democracy and (2) 
representative democracy. A direct democracy is one in 
which all citizens vote on all issues concerning public
resource allocation. However, larger societies are, of
necessity, representative democracies. In a
representative democracy, citizens elect representatives
to public office. These representatives (public
officials) are endowed with the authority to make
decisions for their constituents. Because public
officials depend on their constituents for election and
re-election, they support legislation that will generate
the votes necessary for election and re-election (Downs
1957). Therefore, theoretically, representative
democracy results in public resource allocation
decisions that are in the best interest of the
citizenry. However, representative democracy does not
always result in public resource allocation decisions
that are in the best interest of its citizens. In
regard to this point Holcombe (1985, 4) states:
In the U.S. case, at least, it appears that the 
governmental form was freely chosen by its 
citizens, and the theoretical challenge is to 
explain how a government freely chosen by its 
citizens can act in a way that is not in the best 
interest of those citizens. Apart from any 
connection with historical reality, any meaningful 
theory of government that shows that the government 
can act against the best interests of its citizens 
must rest on a foundation theory that the offending 
institution could have been chosen voluntarily by 
the governed citizens. It is of relatively little 
importance to point out that a government imposed 
upon people could work against those people's best 
interest. Of far more significance are the cases 
where governments voluntarily chosen by people can 
work against their interests.
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The dominant theory in the economics literature
regarding public sector decision making is public choice
theory. Public choice theory uses the tools and
analytical methods of economics to study the
governmental sector, politics, and the public economy
(Buchanan 1984, 13). In defining public choice theory,
Buchanan (1984, 13) states:
As with economic theory, the analysis attempts to 
relate the behavior of persons in their various 
capacities as voters, as candidates for office, as 
elected representatives, as leaders or members of 
political parties, as bureaucrats (all of these are 
"public choice" roles) to the composite of outcomes 
that we observe or might observe. Public choice 
theory attempts to offer an understanding, an 
explanation, of the complex institutional 
interactions that go on within the political 
sector.
To study public resource allocation decisions, a 
model of governmental decision making is necessary. The 
median voter model (Hotelling 1929; Bowen 1943; Downs 
1957) is the dominant theoretical model used to 
investigate the determinants of public resource 
allocation decisions. The median voter model holds that 
in a democratic setting public resource allocation 
decisions coincide with those preferred by the voter 
having the median preference. Since politicians in a 
representative government, such as the United States, 
require a majority of the votes to get elected to 
office, they tend to propose a political platform that 
appeals to the majority of voters. To be re-elected, a
politician must, while in office, institute policies 
that appeal to a majority of the voters. Therefore, the 
median voter is decisive in election outcomes (Downs 
1957).
Another area of public choice theory attempts to 
explain the public resource allocation decisions of 
bureaucrats. A bureaucrat is ". . . the senior official 
of any bureau with a separate identifiable budget" 
(Niskanen 1971, 22). A bureaucrat is an official 
working within a government's bureaucracy who is not 
necessarily concerned with generating votes in order to 
remain in office. Because a bureaucrat does not need to 
generate votes to remain in office, it is not necessary 
for him or her to be concerned with the efficiency of 
the governmental unit. In other words, bureaucrats are 
not necessarily motivated to implement policies that are 
in the best interest of society.
If a bureaucrat is not compelled to select policies 
that are in the best interest of society, what types of 
policies are bureaucrats likely to implement? To answer 
this question one must consider the factors that drive 
bureaucratic decisions. According to Niskanen (1971), a 
bureaucrat is driven to maximize personal utility. In 
Niskanens' view, one of the arguments in a bureaucrat's 
utility function is the size of his or her budget. 
Accordingly, bureaucrats seek to maximize their budgets.
In his book, Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government. Niskanen (1971) develops a theory of 
bureaucracy. He argues that government tends to produce 
an output level that is greater than the optimal level. 
One of the basic tenants of this theory is that 
bureaucrats are motivated by self-interest. The theory 
of bureaucracy suggests that when a bureaucrat decides 
to privatize a municipal service, it is done because 
this decision increases personal utility in some way. 
Similarly, when a bureaucrat decides not to privatize a 
municipal service, this decision also increases personal 
utility in some way. Therefore, a model of the decision 
to privatize RSC must utilize variables that capture the 
arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function. Since 
these arguments are unknown, the present study uses the 
theory of bureaucracy to guide the selection of 
independent variables that impact a bureaucrat's 
decision to privatize RSC.
Bureaucrats serve politicians. Therefore, the 
actions of bureaucrats are constrained by the 
politicians and voters they serve. In accordance with 
the work of Downs (1957) the present study assumes that 
politicians are vote maximizers and voters are 
rationally ignorant. Voter ignorance of political 
issues is rational because of the cost of becoming 
informed (Downs 1957). Becoming informed is very costly
on an individual level. The phenomenon of rational 
ignorance provides a range of voter indifference in 
which voters are apathetic regarding the political 
process. Within this range of indifference bureaucrats 
may act as utility maximizers and disregard the best 
interests of the citizenry. However, outside of this 
range of indifference voters are motivated to take 
political action. Two issues that tend to mobilize 
voters into action are (1) tax increases above some 
threshold level and (2) the perception of excessive 
government waste. The results of a study by Ingram and 
Copeland (1981) suggest that municipal accounting data 
may be useful in explaining voter behavior. In their 
study, Ingram and Copeland (1981) use municipal 
accounting information to predict the outcome of 
elections for mayor in 113 cities with populations 
greater than 25,000. According to Ingram and Copeland 
(1981, 840) municipal accounting data and socio­
demographic data provide information that may be useful 
in predicting mayoral election results. The Ingram and 
Copeland (1981) study provides some evidence that 
municipal accounting data reflects policies implemented 
by politicians. Furthermore, municipal accounting data 
appears to impound information that is used in voting 
decisions.
Determinants of Accounting Choice 
Models based on the cumulative logistic probability 
function (logit) and the cumulative normal probability 
function (probit) are used extensively by accounting 
researchers to investigate the determinants of 
accounting choice. Logit and probit overcome problems 
associated with ordinary least squares regression when 
the dependent variable is dichotomous. This section 
reviews several accounting studies that employ logit or 
probit.
Senteney and Strawser
Senteney and Strawser (1990) investigate the 
association between financial statement effects and the 
early adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard No. 87 (SFAS 87). A cross-sectional logit 
model is employed to assess the simultaneous impact of 
five independent variables on the early adoption 
decision. The dependent variable in the logit model 
assumes the value of 1 if a firm elects early adoption 
of SFAS 87 and 0 if the firm does not elect early 
adoption. The results indicate that the ratio of 
accumulated benefit obligation to fair value of plan 
assets is significant regarding the early adoption of 
SFAS 87 (p = 0.05). The ratio of total debt to total 
equity is only marginally significant (p = 0.15). The 
remaining three variables are not significantly
different from zero. The overall logit model only 
exhibits marginal significance. Therefore, in general, 
the independent variables in this study do not explain 
management's decision to adopt SFAS 87 prior to the 
implementation date (Senteney and Strawser 1990).
Elliott et al.
Elliott et al. (1984) use logit to identify 
characteristics of firms that elect to capitalize 
research and development (R&D) costs prior to Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard No. 2 which requires 
companies to expense R&D outlays in the year incurred. 
The model uses 75 capitalizing and 560 expensing firms 
having average R&D/Sales ratios greater than one percent 
during the period 1974-76 (Elliott et al. 1984, 94).
The findings indicate that capitalizing firms tend to 
have both negative retained earnings and highly variable 
R&D expenditures over time.
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) use probit to study 
the determinants of the decision to capitalize interest. 
The dependent variable in this study represents the 
method of accounting for interest costs that are related 
to expenditures on assets not yet in service. The two 
allowable methods prior to SEC Accounting Series Release 
No. 163 in 1974, are (1) expensing interest costs and
(2) capitalizing interest costs. The dependent variable 
is therefore dichotomous. Independent variables 
include: (1) the existence of a management compensation 
plan explicitly tied to reported earnings (a dummy 
variable), (2) a dividend constraint dummy variable, (3) 
interest coverage ratio, (4) leverage ratio, and (5) 
firm size. According to the results of the probit 
model, debt covenant variables significantly influence 
the corporate decision to capitalize interest.
Hagerman and Zmijewski
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) use probit to study 
the determinants of accounting policy choices. The data 
consists of a cross-sectional sample of 300 firms that 
disclose their choice of accounting methods in their 
1975 annual and/or SEC 10-K reports. Four accounting 
policy choices are investigated: (1) inventory method—  
LIFO vs. FIFO, (2) depreciation method— accelerated vs. 
straight line, (3) treatment of the investment tax 
credit— flow-through vs. deferral, and (4) amortization 
period of past service pension costs— less than 30 years 
vs. 30 years or more.
The dependent variable is the effect (i.e., 
increasing or decreasing) of the policy choice on net 
income. The dependent variable is therefore 
dichotomous. The model includes six independent 
variables: (1) firm size— sales and total assets, (2)
capital intensity— the ratio of gross fixed assets to 
sales, (3) concentration ratio— the percentage of sales 
accounted for by the eight largest firms in each four 
digit standard industrial code category in the sample,
(4) the existence of a profit sharing plan (dummy 
variable), (5) risk— the beta of the firm, and (6) the 
effective tax rate (used only in the inventory choice 
models to control for the tax effects of the choice 
between FIFO and LIFO). The models for depreciation 
method choice and inventory method choice are 
statistically significant.
The above studies illustrate the use of logit and 
probit to investigate the determinants of policy choice 
decisions when the dependent variable is dichotomous. A 
dichotomous dependent variable causes the error term in 
an ordinary least squares regression to be 
heteroscedastic (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979, 149-150). 
Therefore, ordinary least squares parameter estimates 
are unbiased but inefficient, making the usual tests of 
statistical inference inappropriate. Probit and logit 
are techniques specifically designed for qualitative 
(i.e., dichotomous) dependent variables, such as the 
decision to privatize RSC.
Summary
This chapter presents a review of the literature 
relevant to the present study. The first section
reviews studies regarding the efficiency of private 
sector versus public sector production. The main 
conclusion of this line of literature is that private 
sector production is less costly than public sector 
production. The second section discusses studies that 
investigate the determinants of the decision to 
privatize public services. These studies suggest that 
the decision to privatize municipal services is 
influenced by the interaction of voters, politicians, 
and bureaucrats. The third section presents public 
choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy as the 
theoretical foundation for constructing a model of the 
decision to privatize RSC. Finally, the fourth section 
reviews studies that use logit and probit to illustrate 




This chapter formally presents the theoretical 
framework employed in this study. The framework 
synthesizes two theories that dominate the economic 
literature regarding the allocation of public resources: 
(1) Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy and (2) 
public choice theory. The decision to privatize a 
service financed by government is a public resource 
allocation decision. Public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy provide the foundation for a 
comprehensive theoretical framework useful for analyzing 
public resource allocation decisions resulting from the 
interaction of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.
The first section of this chapter presents the 
theory of bureaucracy as advanced by Niskanen (1971). 
Public choice theory is the subject of the second 
section. The third section synthesizes the theory of 
bureaucracy and public choice theory into a unified 
theoretical framework. The fourth section describes the 
linkage between municipal accounting data, public choice 
theory, and the theory of bureaucracy. The chapter 
concludes with a brief summary.
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The Theory of Bureaucracy
In his book, Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government. Niskanen (1971) develops an economic theory 
of bureaucracy behavior. One of the basic tenants of 
this theory is that a bureaucrat is motivated by self- 
interest. That is, a bureaucrat is a utility 
maximizer. This tenant implies that the criteria for 
deciding among alternatives will emphasize the effect of 
a decision upon the bureaucrat rather than the 
organization. Clearly, a model of bureaucratic decision 
processes must then utilize variables that capture the 
arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function.
Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy provides insight 
into the arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function.
According to Niskanen (1971), a bureaucrat is an 
official working in the public sector who does not 
depend on votes to remain in office. Because 
bureaucrats do not depend upon votes, it is not 
necessary for them to be very concerned with the impact 
of their decisions on voters. This implies that a 
bureaucrat is not necessarily motivated to implement 
policies consistent with voter desires. In Niskanens' 
(1971) view, a bureaucrat makes decisions that enhance 
his or her personal utility. According to Niskanen 
(1971, 38) the utility of a bureaucrat is a function of 
salary, prestige, power, patronage, output of the
bureau, and perquisites of office. All of which " . . .  
are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of 
the bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office" 
(Niskanen 1971, 38). Accordingly, a bureaucrat seeks to 
maximize the size of his or her budget. The remainder 
of this section provides a graphical presentation of the 
basic bureaucracy model (Niskanen 1971, 1-52).
The Budget-Output Function
Niskanen (1971, 15) defines a bureau as an 
organization with two distinguishing characteristics:
(1) the owners and employees are unable to capture any 
of the difference between revenues and costs as personal 
income, and (2) some part of the recurring revenues
derive from sources other than the sale of output at a
per-unit price. A sponsor organization typically grants 
a budget to a bureau, and cost efficiency is typically
not a concern of the head of a bureau.
In the present study, the sponsor organization is 
the city council. The maximum budget that the city 
council (i.e., sponsor) awards a bureau depends upon the 
expected output of the bureau. Figure 3-1 illustrates a 
sponsor organization's demand for the output of a 
bureau. The downward sloping demand curve conveys the 
notion that the sponsor derives less value from each 
additional unit of output G by the bureau. The value of 






Fig. 3-1. Demand for G by sponsor organization
marginal value) is given by: V = v(G).
The area under the demand curve up to G0, fG0v(G)dG,
0
represents the total value of Gq units of G to the 
sponsor. This area, therefore, is the maximum budget 
that the sponsor will award for G0 units of output G, 
the maximum the sponsor will pay to obtain the quantity 
Gq*
Since the sponsor values each additional unit of G 
less, the size of the budget that a sponsor awards to a 
bureau will increase at a decreasing rate as the amount 
of G increases. Figure 3-2 illustrates the relationship 
between the amount of output G expected from a bureau 
and the size of the budget awarded by the sponsor. This 
relationship is referred to as the budget-output 
function and is given by:
B = b (G)
The budget-output function represents the total value of 
various amounts of G to the sponsor (i.e., the maximum 
budget that will be awarded at different levels of G). 






The minimum cost of producing output by a bureau 
can be expressed in a cost-output function, which shows
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B=b(G)
Fig. 3-2. The budget-output function
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the total costs of producing various levels of output.
That is, total production costs C are a function of the 
amount of output G produced (i.e., C = c(G)). The cost- 
output function in Figure 3-3 assumes that fixed costs 
for the bureau are zero, but this can be easily 
generalized to fixed costs being positive5. The cost- 
output function is also assumed to increase at a 
constant rate6. Therefore, the marginal cost function 
is a horizontal line (i.e., zero slope) as in Figure 3- 
4.
Since the operation of a bureau is dependent upon 
funding from its sponsor, the sponsor must award a 
budget that is greater than or equal to the total cost 
of producing output G. Consequently, a bureau will 
continue to operate, if and only if, B > C.
5Fixed costs (FC) are zero in the long run, (since all 
cost are variable in the long run) but in the short-run we 
would expect FC > 0.
6In general, as production increases, fixed factors 
constrain the production process thus causing an increasing 
marginal cost of variable factors of production. A cost- 
output function exhibiting increasing marginal costs 
captures the diminishing marginal productivity of variable 
factors in the short-run; however, this is not essential to 
the analysis. Steadily increasing marginal costs of output 
in conjunction with a positive (or zero) fixed cost 





Fig. 3-3. The cost-output function
MC_ dCdG
Fig. 3-4. The Marginal cost function
Bureaucratic Equilibrium
Given that a bureau only operates when B > C, the 
upper and lower bounds of bureau output G may be shown 
by graphing a budget-output function and a cost-output
function on the same graph. Figures 3-5a and 3-6a
illustrate the equilibrium level of bureau output under 
two different assumptions.
In Figure 3-5a output level is the maximum 
output that a bureau will supply. Beyond G^ the size of 
the budget a sponsor organization will award a bureau 
will start to decrease. Point G^ is the "demand- 
constrained” maximum. This phenomenon is seen in Figure 
3-5b. Recall that V is the value of each additional 
unit of G. Unit G^ provides zero value to the sponsor. 
Units of G beyond G^ have a negative "value” to the
sponsor. In theory, the bureau must pay the sponsor to
accept additional units of G beyond G^ (i.e., reduce the 
size of the bureau's budget). The amount of G actually 
supplied will be somewhere between zero and G^.
According to the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971), 
a bureaucrat prefers to supply G^ because this output 
level provides the largest budget.
The budget-output function represents the maximum 
budget a sponsor is willing to award for various levels 
of output G. The cost-output function represents the 







Fig. 3-5. Demand constrained equilibrium
Fig. 3-6. Budget constrained equilibrium
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Therefore, the bureau in Figure 3-5a is not motivated to 
be efficient because B > C at all levels of G within the 
relevant range (i.e., 0 < G < G^)7. A situation where B 
> C is very likely since a bureau generally will not 
reveal its true minimum operating cost to its sponsor.
A bureaucrat may exploit this information asymmetry.
Since a sponsor organization is unable to directly 
monitor a bureau (i.e., know minimum production costs), 
the sponsor is in the position of having to award a 
budget based on past bureau behavior. Therefore, a 
budget maximizing bureaucrat has no incentive to 
minimize costs since the size of his or her budget will 
to some extent be based on past expenditure levels.
This information asymmetry allows a bureau to operate in 
an inefficient manner. In fact, according to Niskanen 
(1971, 48) ". . . it [a bureau] should be expected to 
seek out expenditures beyond those minimally required in 
order to exhaust the approved budget."
From society's viewpoint the optimal level of 
output in Figure 3-5b is G2. At G2 the cost of 
producing an additional unit of G is just equal to the
Efficiency here refers to the minimizing of costs. 
Later in the text reference is made to social efficiency. 
Social efficiency refers to supplying the optimal amount of 
a good from the viewpoint of society. The socially optimal 
level of G is that level where the benefit derived from an 
additional unit of G is just equal to the additional (i.e., 
marginal) cost incurred (i.e., social marginal benefits 
equal social marginal costs).
additional benefits derived from that unit. That is, at 
G2 the social marginal benefits (SMB) are equal to the 
social marginal costs (SMC). The point at which SMB 
equal SMC is the socially optimal (efficient) level of 
production of G.
Figure 3-6 illustrates a situation in which the 
cost-output function intersects the budget-output 
function at a level of G that is lower than G ^  Since 
total costs at Gl are greater than the maximum amount of 
budget the sponsor organization is willing to provide at 
Gl, the equilibrium output is less than G^. The 
socially optimal level of G is G4, since this is the 
point at which SMB equal SMC. However, a budget 
maximizing bureaucrat prefers to supply G in the amount 
of G3 since this is where his or her budget is maximized 
subject to the constraint that B > C. Because of this 
budget constraint, G3 is referred to as the "budget 
constrained" maximum. Note that if the bureau in Figure 
3-6 is operating at G3 it is efficient (i.e., minimizing 
costs). However, it is not socially efficient (i.e., 
operating where SMB = SMC).
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 illustrate that a budget 
maximizing bureaucrat tends to supply more output than 
is socially optimal. Since expenditures are a positive 
monotonic function of bureau output, a bureau tends
toward expenditure levels that are greater than the 
social optima.
Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory is an economic theory of how 
governments allocate public resources. The means by 
which public resource are allocated is the political, or 
voting, process. Consequently, voter preferences are 
the starting point for understanding public resource 
allocation decisions. The dominant framework for 
studying the impact of voters on public resource 
allocation is the median voter model.
The Median Voter Model
The median voter model (Bowen 1943; Downs 1957) 
assumes that preferences are single-peaked (Black 1987). 
Figure 3-7 illustrates the preferences curves of three 
voters; however, this analysis can be easily generalized 
to any number of voters. Single-peakedness refers to 
the notion that each person has some preferred level of 
government output G. Each person prefers a level of 
output closer to his or her peak over levels further 
away (Boadway and Wildasin 1984, 146). In Figure 3-7, 
persons A, B, and C will all vote to increase the level 
of G from 0 to GA since this is closer to their 
respective peaks. Voters B and C will vote to increase 




against such a proposal. In a simple majority rule 
election, the increase from to Gq will win by a two 
to one margin. A proposition to increase the level of G 
from GB to G q  will receive support from voter C but not 
voters A and B, thus the proposition will be defeated.
If preferences are single-peaked, it is clear that the 
majority of voters prefer the level of G corresponding 
to the level preferred by the median voter.
Figure 3-8 illustrates the demand for G by voters 
A, B, and C. Note that the demand curves are downward 
sloping. This represents the notion that each voter 
values each additional unit of G less than the previous 
unit. The marginal cost (MC) divided by the number of 
voters (N) represents the tax price to each voter A, B, 
and C. Note that each voter prefers a different level 
of G at a given tax price. Recall that a demand curve 
illustrates the total value of each unit to the 
individual. In the case of Figure 3-8, the individual 
demand curves represent the marginal value of each 
additional unit of G to voter A, B, and C respectively. 
The most preferred level of G for each person is the 
level at which the marginal value of an additional unit 
of G equals the marginal cost of obtaining an additional 
unit of G. This point corresponds to the peak of each 
voter's preference curve (see Figure 3-7).
$/Unit
Most empirical tests of the median voter model 
regress expenditure levels for a community on 
socioeconomic variables that represent the median voter 
of the community (e.g., median income). The predictive 
accuracy of the median voter model is assessed by 
evaluating the statistical significance of the 
coefficients in the regression equation. Inman (1978) 
tests the median voter hypothesis in a study of 58 Long 
Island school districts using a majority rule referendum 
for budget approval. His results support the median 
voter hypothesis.8 Figure 3-9 illustrates the 
relationship between voters and public resource 
allocation decisions in a direct democracy. Assuming 
single-peaked preference curves and a simple 
majority rule election, public resource allocation 
decisions will match the preferences of the median 
voter. Municipal financial records should reflect these 
public resource allocation decisions.
Voter Utility
Voters derive utility from the consumption of 
public goods (G) and private goods (X). However, voters 
are constrained in the amounts of G and X they can 
consume by personal income (I). If we assume p to be
8Many studies empirically test the median voter 
hypothesis. See for example, Barr and Davis 1966; 
Borcherding and Deacon 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; 
Pommerehne 1978; and Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982.
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the price of X and t to represent the tax paid per unit 
of public good G, a constrained maximization problem can 
be stated as follows:
MAX Uv = u(G, X) 
s.t. I = tG + pX
Figure 3-10 illustrates that a voter will prefer a 
combination of G and X in the amounts of Gq and Xq when 
the tax price per unit is tj_,. This combination is
preferred because it puts him or her on the highest
indifference curve possible subject to his or her budget 
constraint. Recall that an indifference curve 
represents the amount of utility derived for various 
combinations of G and X. All points on an indifference 
curve provide the same utility to the individual. A 
higher indifference curve, such as U q , represents a 
greater degree of utility than a lower indifference 
curve, such as l^. The most preferred combination of G 
and X is the point at which an
indifference curve is just tangent to the budget line.
In Figure 3-10, the combination Gq and Xq is most 
preferred at tax price t^.
If the tax price per unit is increased from t! to 
t2 the budget line will rotate clockwise pivoting at 
I/p. Now the most preferred combination is G0 and Xj. 
The increased tax price means that the voter will prefer 
the same amount of G as before, however, he will only be
Fig. 3-10. Preferred combination of G and X at different 
tax prices.
able to purchase X^ of other goods. The increased tax 
price results in a lower level of utility for the voter. 
This lower utility level is shown by the indifference 
curve labeled Uj_. Since is lower than U0, the voter 
derives less overall utility from the combination G0, 
than from combination G0, X0.
Representative Democracy
The two dominant institutional arrangements for 
making public resource allocation decisions in a 
democratic society are (1) direct democracy and (2) 
representative democracy. A direct democracy is one in 
which all citizens vote on all issues concerning public 
resource allocation via referendum. However, larger 
societies are, of necessity, representative democracies. 
In a representative democracy, citizens elect 
representatives to public office. These representatives 
(public officials) are endowed with the authority to 
make decisions for their constituents. Downs (1957) 
explicitly incorporates representative democracy into 
the analysis of public sector decision making. Because 
public officials depend upon their constituents for 
election and re-election, they support legislation 
designed to generate the votes necessary for election 
and re-election (Downs 1957). In a simple majority rule 
election, a politician who is a member of a two-party 
system, will propose a political platform designed to
appeal to the majority of the voters (Downs 1957). More 
specifically, a politician seeks the support of at least 
one-half plus one of the voters. In other words, the 
median voter is the decisive vote. Therefore in a 
representative democracy, just as in a direct democracy, 
public resource allocation decisions coincide with the 
preferences of the median voter.
According to Downs (1957), politicians are utility 
maximizers who derive utility from holding elective 
office. Therefore, a politician attempts to maximize 
votes. A politicians objective function can be 
expressed as:
Max Up = u(votes)
In a two-party system a politician seeking to maximize 
his or her appeal to the majority of voters will support 
a political platform that is similar to the preferences 
of the median voter (Downs 1957). Figure 3-11 
illustrates a situation in which the political 
ideological preferences of voters are single-peaked. 
Under this assumption a politician attempting to 
maximize votes will take a position that is near the 
center of the political spectrum. A politician running 
on an extremely liberal (conservative) platform stands 






The above discussion implicitly assumes that voters 
are politically active. However, not all voters are 
politically active. Some voters are ignorant of 
political issues (Downs 1957). A person may be ignorant 
of political issues for a variety of reasons. One 
reason is the high cost of becoming an informed voter. 
Since the probability of a single voter making a 
difference in the outcome of an election is small, the 
benefit derived from becoming informed and casting a 
vote is insignificant to many people (Downs 1957). From 
a cost-benefit point of view, it is rational to be 
ignorant of political issues and to forego voting. Such 
political ignorance is referred to as "rational 
ignorance" (Downs 1957).
It is less costly for people with a common purpose 
to form interest groups because the group can share the 
work of becoming informed. The probability of receiving 
the benefits of becoming informed is increased for 
interest groups since the group can cast a block of 
votes. This block of votes compose a larger percentage 
of the total votes than a single vote.
The potential to influence the outcome of an 
election makes interest groups very important to 
politicians. These interest groups (i.e., lobbyist) 
lobby legislators to support their cause. On the other
hand, politicians seeking office attempt to generate the 
support of large interest groups by supporting the 
agenda of the interest group. The actions of the 
lobbyist are referred to as "rent seeking" (Tullock 
1967). Rent seeking is a wasteful activity from 
society's viewpoint because it does not increase output. 
Rather, it simply redistributes who gets the money 
associated with creating existing output (Varian 1987, 
398). One rent seeking interest group in the present 
study is public employees. Public employees are a very 
active interest group and can, therefore, find support 
among politicians. This suggests that public employees 
may lobby local politicians to forgo privatization of 
RSC. This aversion to privatization is expected because 
public employees stand to lose the most (their 
employment) from privatization.
The relationship between voters, politicians, and 
public resource allocation decisions is depicted in 
Figure 3-12. The model in Figure 3-12 illustrates that 
politicians make public resource decisions for voters. 
Since politicians depend on voters to get elected or re­
elected, public resource allocation decisions reflect 
the will of the voters. More specifically, in a simple 
majority rule voting model the median voter's 
preferences prevail in resource allocation decisions. 
Therefore, even with politicians in the model, public
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resource allocation decisions correspond to those 
preferred by the median voter.
Public Choice, Bureaucracy Theory 
and the Decision to Privatize
This section presents a theoretical framework to 
explain the impact of voters, politicians, and 
bureaucrats on the municipal decision to privatize RSC.
The voter model is combined with the bureaucracy model 
to provide a unified theory of the privatization 
decision. In this development, bureaucrats are utility 
maximizers in accordance with Niskanen's theory of 
bureaucracy (1971), politicians and voters are vote 
maximizers and rationally ignorant respectively in 
accordance with Downs (1957). The "rational ignorance" 
of voters is generally attributed to the notion that the 
costs associated with becoming an informed voter are 
greater than the expected benefits. If the benefits of 
being informed exceed the associated costs, it is 
beneficial for a voter to become informed and 
politically active.
In Figure 3-13, budget line 1 (BL^) represents the 
various combinations of RSC services (G) and all other 
goods (X) that can be purchased by the median voter of a 
community. According to Figure 3-13, the optimal amount 
of G for the median voter is G4. This level of G puts 
the median voter on the highest indifference curve
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Fig. 3-13. Voter utility levels for various levels of G
possible (U4) given the budget constraint. Any level 
less than or more than G4 puts this individual on a 
lower indifference curve indicating less utility. The 
distance (M) between BL^ and BL2 represents the median 
voter's expected mobilization costs. Mobilization costs 
include the cost of gathering and processing information 
(i.e., the costs of becoming informed). If the voter 
incurs these costs, his or her budget line shifts from 
BL3 to BI»2 because mobilization costs reduce net income 
available for consumption. At BL2 this voter prefers a 
level of G equal to G3 since this puts him or her on the 
highest possible indifference curve (U2) given the new 
budget constraint BL2. Therefore, the expected level of 
G from incurring mobilization costs, M, is G3.
It is only beneficial for the voter in Figure 3-13 
to incur mobilization costs M when the level of G is 
greater than G6 or less than G2. This cost-benefit 
relationship is apparent after analyzing this voter's 
utility level at various points on the graph. Assume 
that the level of G government provides is G5 . At this 
level this voter will be on U3. If mobilization costs M 
are incurred, the expected level of G is G3 resulting in 
voter utility level U2 . This voter does not benefit by 
incurring costs M since U3 is higher than U2 . In other 
words, the loss in utility (U4 to U3) from a change in 
the level of G from the optimum level G4 to a level of
G5 does not justify incurring mobilization costs M, 
which results in U2. However, if G is set at a level 
greater than Gg or less than G2 this voter attains a 
utility level that is lower than U2, making it 
beneficial to incur costs M, which results in utility 
level U2.
Levels of G between G2 and Gg do not motivate this 
individual to incur mobilization costs M. The range 
between G2 and Gg is referred to as the "range of voter 
indifference." This range represents output levels 
within which this voter remains "rationally ignorant." 
Outside of the range of voter indifference, we expect 
this voter to become politically active since the 
expected gain in utility justifies incurring 
mobilization costs M.
Figure 3-14 illustrates the supply side of the 
model. The cost-output function (C) represents the 
minimum costs of providing various levels of G. Budget- 
output function reflects a sponsor organization who 
values G less than the sponsor organizations reflected 
in B2, B3 and B4. A budget maximizing bureaucrat 
working for the sponsor organization reflected in B^ 
will prefer to supply a level of G equal to Gi since 




G G G G
Fig. 3-14. Value of G to sponsors with differing budget-
output functions.
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constraint that BX > C9 . Similarly, a budget maximizing 
bureaucrat working for the sponsor organization 
reflected in B4 will prefer to supply a level of G equal 
to G7 since this provides the maximum budget subject to 
the constraint that the marginal value of an additional 
unit must be greater than or equal to 010.
Assuming a budget maximizing bureaucrat, a level of 
G equal to G^ in Figure 3-13 will most likely occur in 
the budget constrained case (i.e., in Figure 3-14).
In this situation, privatization does not yield any 
efficiencies since the bureau is operating at minimum 
costs. A private sector producer can not under-bid this 
bureau since his or her minimum cost will equal that of 
the bureau.
A relatively high level of G equal to G7 in Figure
3-13 will most likely occur in demand constrained bureau 
such as that illustrated by B4 in Figure 3-14. At this 
level of G the bureau is not operating at minimum costs.
In fact, there is "slack" or "waste" (S) in this bureau 
equal to the difference between the size of the budget 
the sponsor is willing to award at that level of G and 
the cost of production. At this level of G
9Recall that this is the "budget constrained" maximum 
discussed in section one of this chapter.
10Recall that this is the "demand constrained" maximum 
discussed in section one of this chapter.
privatization does yield efficiencies. A private sector 
company bidding any amount greater than the minimum cost 
of producing G7 and less than the budget the sponsor is 
willing to award at G7 results in savings to the sponsor 
and profit for the private sector producer.
Figure 3-15 depicts the relationship between the 
level of G provided and the political activity of 
voters. Within the "range of voter indifference" voters 
are not politically active. However, when the level of 
G is outside this range voters begin to put pressure on 
politicians to adjust the level of G to within tolerable 
limits. Politicians in turn place pressure on 
bureaucrats to bring the level of G back into the range 
of voter indifference.
When the level of G is low and outside the range of 
voter indifference, voters incur mobilization costs and 
pressure politicians to increase the level of G (e.g., 
from G^ to G2 in Figures 3-13 and 3-14) as the sponsor's 
demand responds to voter demands. The pressure on 
politicians to increase the level of G implies an upward 
shift in the budget-output function (e.g., from to B2 
in Figure 3-14). Since the size of the budget the 
sponsor organization is willing to provide at G2 is 
slightly greater than the minimum cost to produce G2, a 
private sector producer can provide some savings for the 
sponsor. However the savings are small. Therefore, the
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Fig. 3-15. Theoretical model
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probability of privatization is greater at G2 than at 
— although not very high.
When the level of G is high and outside the range 
of voter indifference, voters incur mobilization costs 
and put pressure on politicians to decrease the level of 
G (e.g., from G7 to Gg in Figures 3-13 and 3-14). The 
demand for a reduction in the level of G implies a 
downward shift of the budget-output function (e.g., from 
B4 to B3 in Figure 3-14). Since the size of the budget 
the sponsor is willing to award at Gg is substantially 
greater than the minimum cost of producing Gg, a private 
sector producer can provide substantial savings to the 
sponsor organization. The probability of privatization 
is greatest at G7, less at Gg, still less at G2 and 
approaches 0 at G^.
Municipal Accounting Data and 
the Decision to Privatize
Public resource allocation decisions are the result 
of a complex set of interactions between voters, 
politicians, and bureaucrats. The previous section 
models this complex set of interactions by synthesizing 
public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy.
This framework is used to model the municipal decision 
to privatize RSC using municipal accounting data. A 
study by Ingram and Copeland (1981) suggests that 
municipal accounting information may be useful in
explaining voter behavior. In their study, municipal 
accounting information is used to predict the outcome of 
mayoral elections in 113 cities with populations greater 
than 25,000. Their results suggest that the combination 
of municipal accounting data and socio-demographic data 
may be useful in predicting election results (Ingram and 
Copeland 1981, 840). The Ingram and Copeland (1981) 
study provides some empirical evidence that municipal 
accounting data reflects the policies implemented by 
politicians (via bureaucrats). Furthermore, municipal 
accounting information appears to impound information 
used by voters in casting their votes.
The model constructed in the previous section 
illustrates that voters only become politically active 
when government output is outside the range of voter 
indifference. Two issues that tend to mobilize voters 
to become politically active are (1) tax increases above 
some threshold level and (2) the perception of excessive 
government waste. Each of these issues is discussed 
below.
Figure 3-10 illustrates that an increase in taxes, 
results in a decrease in voter utility. Therefore, 
voters are tax adverse. Municipal accounting data can 
measure the tax burden placed on voters. As tax levels 
increase voters become politically active and advocate 
cost cutting measures. The amount of total tax revenues
per household provides a measure of the tax burden upon 
the voters of a community. A priori, as the amount of 
tax revenues per household increase, the probability of 
privatization will increase.
Figure 3-14 shows that privatization produces 
efficiencies when the budget of a bureau exceeds the 
cost of production (i.e., when there is slack in the 
budget). As discussed in the previous section, 
budgetary slack is more likely to occur at higher output 
levels rather than lower levels. RSC expenditures per 
household can proxy for excessive government waste, or 
slack. Voters become politically active as the level of 
government waste increases. Therefore, as RSC 
expenditures per household increase, the probability of 
privatization increases.
According to the theoretical framework presented in 
this chapter, bureaucrats, ceteris paribus, prefer 
municipal RSC to contract RSC. Prior research suggests 
that municipal RSC is more costly than contract RSC 
(Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978; Bennett and 
Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; Berenyi and Stevens 1988). 
However, voters prefer the least costly method of RSC 
since this decreases their tax burden. Therefore, 
bureaucrats can only act on their preference when voters 
do not perceive that they are bearing the cost of the 
more expensive municipal RSC. While voters are aware
that they bear the cost of tax revenues available to 
bureaucrats (e.g., local sales taxes), they are 
generally unaware that they bear the cost of certain 
non-tax revenue sources available to the bureaucrat 
(e.g., general obligation bond proceeds). General 
obligation bonds are a source of revenue that allows a 
governmental unit to shift payment for current 
consumption into the future; for example, current levels 
of G may be increased without a corresponding increase 
in taxes. Consequently, voters do not perceive the 
costs associated with general obligation debt.
Therefore, as the amount of general obligation bonds 
outstanding increase, the probability of privatization 
will decrease.
Intergovernmental revenues are another source of 
funds available to the bureaucrat. If intergovernmental 
revenues are an unrestricted source of funds, a 
bureaucrat is able to increase the level of G without a 
corresponding increase in taxes. Since the tax price to 
voters remains unchanged, they are indifferent to the 
increased level of G (i.e., they are in the range of 
indifference). This allows a bureaucrat to continue to 
use municipal RSC rather than contract RSC. Therefore, 
as intergovernmental revenues per household increase, 
the probability of privatization decreases.
However, intergovernmental revenues may be awarded 
on the basis of financial need. If these revenues are a 
proxy for financial need, the level of G cannot be 
increased without a corresponding increase in taxes. An 
increase in taxes causes the level of voter utility to 
decrease. This in turn causes voters to put pressure on 
politicians to reduce taxes. Bureaucrats are then 
pressured by politicians to reduce costs. Privatization 
is an attractive means of reducing costs. Therefore, as 
intergovernmental revenues per household increase, the 
probability of privatization increases. From the above 
discussion, the effect of intergovernmental revenues on 
the privatization decision is ambiguous and is tested 
empirically.
The range of voter indifference is greater for 
affluent communities. This is because of the 
opportunity costs of becoming informed (i.e., 
mobilization costs). Becoming informed regarding 
political issues is a time consuming process as is 
voting. This makes it more expensive for high income 
individuals to become informed. Therefore, bureaucrats 
in affluent communities are less likely to privatize 
RSC. The average household's assessed valuation 
multiplied by the property tax millage rate is a measure 
of the property taxes paid by the average household in a 
community. This provides a measure of the wealth of a
community. Wealthy communities are less likely to 
privatize RSC.
Politicians are subject to pressure from special 
interest or rent seeking, groups. One special interest 
group that is against privatization is public employees. 
Public employees stand the most to lose (i.e., their 
jobs) from privatization. A priori, as municipal 
employees as a percent of total population increase, the 
probability of privatization decreases.
According to the theoretical framework in the 
previous section, voters are more likely to become 
politically active when the costs of becoming informed 
are low. The use of a user fee for RSC provides 
information to voters at little or no cost. A user fee 
makes the cost of RSC explicit to the voter. This 
information allows voters to compare the cost of RSC in 
their community to the cost in other communities. Since 
the cost of contract RSC is lower, voters are likely to 
become politically active and pressure politicians to 
privatize RSC (if not already privatized) when a user 
fee is assessed.
Summary
This chapter presents the theoretical framework 
used in this study. The first section describes the 
theory of bureaucracy as advanced by Niskanen (1971).
The second section discusses public choice theory. The
third section synthesizes the theory of bureaucracy and 
public choice theory into a unified theoretical 
framework. The fourth section describes the linkage 
between municipal accounting data, public choice theory, 
and the theory of bureaucracy.
CHAPTER 4
METHOD
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
research method of this study. The first section 
presents the research question, this is followed by a 
discussion of the research hypotheses in the second 
section. The third section presents the formal model, 
while the fourth section describes the method of data 
collection. The fifth section describes the statistical 
procedures used to analyze the data. The chapter 
concludes with a brief summary.
Research Question 
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
Concepts Statement No. 1, "Objectives of Financial 
Reporting," states that a government's financial reports 
should allow citizens to assess the accountability of 
public officials (GASB 1987, 27). This implies that 
municipal accounting data should allow citizens to 
evaluate public resource allocation decisions made by 
public officials. The purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the extent to which municipal accounting data 
is useful for modeling a specific public resource
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allocation decision: the decision to privatize RSC. The 
primary research question is:
Is municipal accounting data useful for modeling
the municipal decision to privatize RSC?
This study provides empirical evidence regarding whether 
municipal accounting data provides information useful 
for assessing the accountability of public officials— a 
stated objective of GASB Concepts Statement No. 1.
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less 
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; 
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; 
Berenyi and Stevens 1988). However, there are many 
municipalities that do not use contract RSC. Therefore, 
minimizing costs does not appear to be a primary concern 
of public sector decision makers (i.e., bureaucrats) 
when deciding whether to privatize RSC. The synthesis 
of public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy 
presented in the previous chapter provides a theoretical 
framework for modeling public resource allocation 
decisions resulting from the interaction of voters, 
politicians, and bureaucrats. Hypotheses derived from 
public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy are 
used to investigate the research question above. 
Municipal accounting data is used to operationalize the 
hypotheses.
Research Hypotheses 
Given the general conclusion of prior research that 
private sector production is less costly than public 
sector production, it is curious that public sector 
production remains popular in so many municipalities.
One possible explanation for the persistence of public 
sector production, when private sector alternatives 
exit, is that public sector production increases the 
size of the budget under the control of a bureaucrat. 
According to Niskanen (1971, 38), the variables that 
enter into a bureaucrat's utility function are a 
positive monotonic function of the size of the budget 
controlled by a bureaucrat. Therefore, a larger budget 
enhances the utility of a bureaucrat. The increase in 
utility may be in the form of the prestige that comes 
from being a part of a large organization or the 
increase in salary that comes with the additional 
responsibilities associated with a larger span of 
control. In Niskanen*s (1971) view, bureaucrats are 
motivated by their own self-interest, rather than the 
interest of the citizenry. Cost efficiency, therefore, 
becomes a secondary objective in bureaucratic decision 
making. As discussed in the previous chapter, voters 
constrain bureaucrats by putting pressure on 
politicians. When expenditure levels increase beyond 
some threshold level (i.e., force voters outside their
range of indifference), voters mobilize into action. 
Voters then exert pressure upon politicians to reduce 
government spending. One method to reduce the level of 
government expenditures is to provide services in a less 
costly manner (e.g., privatization). This leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
: Ceteris paribus, as total RSC expenditures per
household increase, the probability of 
privatization will increase.
Tax revenues represent a significant proportion of 
total municipal revenues. For fiscal 1984-85 total 
taxes accounted for 54.1% of Louisiana local government 
total own-source revenues (Cohen 1988, 69). Total tax 
revenues per household represent the tax burden upon 
voters. If the tax burden increases above some 
threshold level, voters become politically active (i.e., 
forced outside their range of indifference). A 
politician attempting to levy taxes higher than this 
threshold level, will lose the support of the voters.
To avoid raising taxes beyond this threshold, a 
politician will advocate aggressive cost cutting 
measures. One method to reduce costs is to use less 
costly service delivery arrangements for public 
services. One such arrangement is the privatization of 
RSC. Stated in the alternative form, it is hypothesized 
that:
H2 : Ceteris paribus, as total tax revenues per
household increase, the probability of 
privatization will increase.
A rational person will not take the time to become 
informed (or to vote) unless the benefits outweigh the 
associated costs (Downs 1957). Therefore, the range of 
voter indifference is greater in wealthy communities 
because of the greater opportunity costs of becoming 
informed and taking the time to vote. These opportunity 
costs make it possible for bureaucrats (and politicians) 
to be less concerned with minimizing the cost of 
services provided to residents (e.g., RSC). Hence, 
affluent communities are less likely to privatize RSC. 
The average household's assessed valuation multiplied by 
the property tax millage rate is a measure of the 
property taxes paid by the average household in a 
community. This is a proxy for the wealth of a 
community. This leads to the following hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative form):
H3 : Ceteris paribus, as the amount of property
taxes paid by the average household increase, 
the probability of privatization will 
decrease.
General obligation bonds are long-term debt 
instruments backed by the full faith and credit of the 
issuing municipality. General obligation debt provide a 
means of financing current consumption with future tax 
revenues. Therefore, general obligation bond proceeds 
represent an additional source of revenue available to
the bureaucrat. These additional revenues make it 
possible for a bureaucrat to engage in inefficient 
activities (e.g., municipal RSC rather than contract 
RSC). This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in 
the alternative form):
H4: Ceteris paribus, as the amount of general
obligation debt outstanding per household 
increases, the probability of privatization 
will decrease.
Voters and bureaucrats may view state and federal 
grants as "free money." This influx of free money 
reduces the need for efficient government spending and 
allows bureaucrats to keep RSC in the public domain. 
However, eligibility for state and federal grants may be 
based on financial need. If this is the case, grant 
monies are a proxy for fiscal crises. A municipality 
experiencing fiscal crises tends to aggressively pursue 
less costly means of service delivery (e.g., 
privatization). Both of these arguments are reasonable. 
Theoretically, the level of intergovernmental revenues 
received should impact on the decision to privatize RSC, 
however, a priori, the direction of the relationship is 
not definite. This leads to the following hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative form):
H5: Ceteris paribus, the amount of
intergovernmental revenues per household will 
impact on the decision to privatize RSC.
Politicians compete for votes. According to the 
median voter model, politicians advocate policies to
generate the support of the voter with the median 
preference (Downs 1957). However, not all voters are 
politically active. Many voters are "rationally 
ignorant" of political issues (Downs 1957). Being 
ignorant of political issues is rational because of the 
costs of becoming informed on an individual basis. It 
is cost efficient for groups of individuals with common 
interests to form a coalition in order to spread the 
cost of becoming informed across more individuals, 
thereby decreasing the cost per individual. These 
coalitions or special interest groups disseminate 
information to members and non-members to generate 
support for their cause. This gives a special interest 
group substantial political clout. Politicians tend to 
support the causes of special interest groups because of 
the vote power these groups possess. Vote power refers 
to the percentage of votes in an election that a group 
of voters control (Borcherding, Bush, and Spann 1977). 
One group of voters identified as having a 
disproportionate effect on election results are public 
employees (Bennett and Orzechowski 1983). Public 
employees have a vested interest in the privatization 
decision (i.e., job security), therefore, they tend to 
lobby against privatization. According to Niskanen's 
(1971) view of bureaucracy, budget maximizing 
bureaucrats will support public employees in their quest
to retain RSC in the public domain. Stated in the 
alternative form, it is hypothesized that:
Hg: Ceteris paribus, as the ratio of the number of
municipal employees (less RSC employees) to 
total population increases, the probability of 
privatization will decrease.
Another factor that may impact on the decision to 
privatize RSC is service level. Currently, measures of 
outcome and efficiency of RSC services are not reported 
on a regular basis (Rubin 1990, 265). According to the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) service 
efforts and accomplishments reporting project, the 
frequency of RSC indicates the level of service provided 
to residents and is readily available (Rubin 1990, 269). 
Therefore, this study uses the frequency of RSC as a 
proxy for service level.
Private sector employees operate in a competitive 
environment. The competitive environment makes it 
necessary for a private sector firm to provide a high 
level of services or face losing customers to the 
competition. Municipal employees operate from a 
monopoly position. The lack of competition in the 
public sector makes it possible to provide a lower level 
of service without the fear of losing customers to a 
competitor. This leads to the following hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative form):
H7: Ceteris paribus, as the frequency of RSC
increases, the probability of privatization 
increases.
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When voters are the beneficiaries of many 
governmental services financed by tax revenues they are 
unable to determine the cost of each service separately. 
However, when a user charge is assessed for a particular 
service the cost of that service is made explicit. This 
puts the voter in a position to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of the service. Many studies suggest that 
contract RSC is less costly than municipal RSC.11 
Therefore, communities that assess a user fee are more 
likely to privatize RSC. This leads to the following 
hypothesis;
Hg: Municipalities that assess a user fee for RSC
are more likely to privatize RSC.
In Louisiana, New Orleans is the largest 
metropolitan area and therefore may possess 
characteristics that are different from other 
municipalities in the state. A dummy variable is 
included in the model to capture any systematic 
differences between municipalities in the New Orleans 
area and those outside the New Orleans area. One 
characteristic of metropolitan areas is high population 
density. Metropolitan areas tend to have more people 
per square mile than rural areas. This puts a
13-Kitchen (1976), Savas (1977), Stevens (1978),
Bennett and Johnson (1979), McDavid (1985), and Berenyi & 
Stevens (1988) all find contract RSC to be less costly than 
municipal RSC.
tremendous strain on the ability of government to 
provide services. One means to alleviate this strain is 
to contract out services to the private sector. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H9: Ceteris paribus, municipalities located in the
metropolitan New Orleans area are more likely 
to privatize RSC.
The current study extends the existing literature 
by developing a model of the decision to privatize RSC 
using financial and demographic variables. Prior 
research typically uses socioeconomic independent 
variables to model this decision. One of the 
limitations of socioeconomic data is its availability. 
For example, some data available through the U.S. Census 
Bureau is only published every five years. Another 
limitation of socioeconomic data is that it generally is 
used as a proxy for the data actually used in the 
decision to privatize public services. The present 
study combines internal municipal accounting data with 
current demographic data to model the decision to 
privatize RSC. This data is more representative of the 
type of data used in the privatization decision. Table
4-1 provides a summary of the null hypotheses tested in 
this study.
TABLE 4-1 
SUMMARY OF NULL HYPOTHESES TESTED
H]_: Ceteris paribus, RSC costs per household do not
affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H2 : Ceteris paribus, total tax revenues per household
do not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H3: Ceteris paribus, the amount of property taxes
generated by the average household does not affect
the decision to privatize RSC.
H4 : Ceteris paribus, the amount of general obligation
bonded debt outstanding per household does not 
affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H5: Ceteris paribus, the amount of intergovernmental
revenues per household do not affect the decision 
to privatize RSC.
H6: Ceteris paribus, the ratio of the number of
municipal employees (less RSC employees) to total 
population does not affect the decision to 
privatize RSC.
H7 : Ceteris paribus, the frequency of RSC does not
affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H8: Ceteris paribus, the assessment of a RSC user fee
does not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
Hg: Ceteris paribus, the geographic proximity of a
municipality to the metropolitan New Orleans area 
does not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
The Model
Financial and demographic data operationalize the 
hypotheses outlined above. The dependent variable in 
the model is the method of RSC. This study investigates 
two methods of RSC:
1. Municipal— where RSC is provided by municipal 
employees, and
2. Contract— where RSC is provided by a private 
sector firm under contract with a municipality.
The qualitative nature of the dependent variable in the 
model creates certain statistical problems. However, 
techniques are available to handle these problems. 
Probabalistic regression analysis (probit) and logistic 
regression analysis (logit) are two statistical 
techniques available for managing the problems 
associated with a dichotomous dependent variable. Logit 
is based on a cumulative logistic probability function, 
while probit is based on a cumulative normal 
probability distribution. These two models are very 
similar:
The logistic and normal curves are so similar 
as to yield essentially identical results. In 
practice they yield estimated choice probabilities 
that differ by less than .02 and which can be 
distinguished, in the sense of statistical 
significance, only with very large samples. The 
choice between them, therefore, revolves around 
practical concerns such as the availability and 
flexibility of computer programs and personal 
preferences and experience (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984, 34).
Logit is used in this study. A chi-square test is used 
to evaluate the overall significance of the model as 
well as the statistical significance of the individual 
coefficients. The alpha level used for determining 
statistical significance in this study is .10. The 
following logit model is estimated:
METHOD = a + ^REFUSE + /32TAXREV + £3 PROPERTY + £4DEBT +
j05GRANTS + (3 5 PCTEMP + /?7FREQ + /SgUSERFEE + /SgNEWORL
where METHOD is a dichotomous variable that assumes the 
value of 1 for contract RSC and 0 for municipal RSC.
The independent variables consist of municipal 
accounting information obtained by means of a survey of 
all Louisiana municipalities. Table 4-2 presents, for 
each hypothesis tested, a brief description of the 
relevant variable and the expected sign of its 
coefficient.
Data Collection 
The data for this study was obtained via a survey 
of all Louisiana municipalities. The survey instrument, 
reproduced in Appendix A, ascertains the method of RSC, 
the cost of providing RSC, and other data necessary for 
the study. The survey was mailed in three bulk mailings 
each approximately one month apart. In the first 
mailing, a survey was sent to all 301 Louisiana 
municipalities. Municipalities not responding to the 
first mailing within one month were sent a second 
survey. A third and final survey was sent out one month 
after the second mailing to those municipalities not 
responding to the first two mailings.
TABLE 4-2
HYPOTHESES, VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, AND 
EXPECTED SIGN FOR COEFFICIENTS
Hypo- Expected
thesis_____________Independent Variable_______________Sian
Hj: REFUSE— total RSC expenditures per (+)
household.
H2 : TAXREV— total tax revenues collected (+)
per household.
H3: PROPERTY— property tax rate times the (-)
total assessed valuation per household.
H4: DEBT— general obligation bonds outstand- (-)
ing per household.
H5 : GRANTS— intergovernmental revenues (?)
per household.
Hg: PCTEMP— ratio of municipal employees (-)
(less RSC employees) to total population.
H7 : FREQ— number of RSC's per week. (+)
H8: USERFEE— dummy variable coded "1" if a (+)
RSC user fee is assessed, "O'' otherwise.
Hg : NEWORL— dummy variable coded "1" if a ( + )
municipality is located in the metro­
politan New Orleans area, "0" otherwise.
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Louisiana municipalities file audited financial 
reports with the Office of the State Legislative 
Auditor, Baton Rouge, Louisiana every four years, two 
years, or annually depending upon the size of the 
municipality. These reports were consulted when surveys 
were returned incomplete. Additionally, information 
supplied via the survey was verified when possible.12
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values) for each of the financial 
and demographic variables are calculated for the two 
groups of municipalities (i.e., municipal and contract).
A t-test is used to determine if the differences between 
the means of the two groups with respect to each 
financial and demographic variable are statistically 
significant.
The logit model is used to test the extent to which, 
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the 
municipal decision to privatize RSC. Logit is an 
appropriate statistical technique to use when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. A chi-square test is 
used to assess how well the model fits the data, as well
12Not all data could be verified because of the 
different filing schedules. If all municipalities were 
required to file a report with the Legislative Auditor's 
Office for the same reporting period the survey instrument 
could have been shortened considerably.
as, to test the statistical significance of the 
individual coefficients. The hypotheses outlined above 
are tested by determining the sign and statistical 
significance of the individual coefficients in the logit 
model.
Multicollinearity among the independent variables 
in a logit model can make interpretation of the 
individual coefficients difficult. Therefore, two tests 
for multicollinearity are conducted. First, Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation Coefficients and associated 
significance levels are calculated to determine the 
extent to which one independent variable is correlated 
with another. Second, each independent variable is 
regressed, in turn, on the remaining independent 
variables. This is an effective technique to determine 
if an independent variable can be expressed as a linear 
combination of the remaining independent variables. A 
high coefficient of multiple determination (R2) for any 
of these multiple regressions would indicate the 
existence of multicollinearity among the independent 
variables.
Summary
This chapter presents the method used to test the 
extent to which municipal accounting data is useful for 
modeling the decision to privatize RSC. The research 
question and research hypotheses are outlined. The
logit model used to test the individual hypotheses is 
also presented. Finally, the method used to collect the 




This chapter reports the results of the study. The 
first section summarizes the procedures used to collect 
the data. The second section reports descriptive 
statistics on each of the demographic and independent 
variables. The third section presents inferential 
statistics regarding the financial and demographic 
characteristics of the two groups of municipalities 
(i.e., municipal and contract). The fourth section 
reports the results of the logistic regression (logit) 
model. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
empirical findings.
Data Collection 
The population of interest for this study includes 
all municipalities in the State of Louisiana. According 
to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1989), Louisiana contains 3 01 
municipalities. Specific data for this study include 
financial and demographic data as well as information 
regarding the method (i.e., municipal or contract) of 
RSC. Current data of this type are not readily
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available for small municipalities (population less than 
10,000). Because the majority of Louisiana 
municipalities are small, a mail survey was used to 
collect the data. Mailing labels addressed to the city 
clerk of each Louisiana municipality were secured from 
the Governmental Services Institute of Louisiana State 
University. A survey instrument, reproduced in the 
Appendix, was designed to collect the data necessary to 
test the hypotheses set forth in the previous chapter. 
The survey was mailed in three separate bulk mailings, 
each approximately one month apart. The first mailing 
consisted of all 301 municipalities. A second survey 
was mailed to those municipalities that had not 
responded within one month of the first mailing. A 
third and final survey was mailed one month after the 
second mailing to those municipalities that had not 
responded to either of the first two mailings.
When surveys were returned incomplete, the missing 
data was obtained by consulting several alternative 
sources. Parish and municipal sales tax rates were 
obtained from the State of Louisiana Department of 
Revenue and Taxation. Six of the surveys returned were 
missing data regarding the number of households. For 
these municipalities the number of households was 
estimated using a two-step procedure. First, the 1980 
population was divided by the 1980 number of households
to obtain the average number of persons per household. 
Second, the current population was divided by the number 
of persons per household calculated in the first step to 
obtain an estimate of the number of current households.
RSC Arrangements in Use
The results of the survey indicate that there are 
three primary RSC arrangements used by Louisiana 
municipalities:
1. Municipal— where RSC is provided by municipal 
employees,
2. Contract— where RSC is provided by a private 
sector firm under contract with the municipality, and
3. Parish— where RSC is provided by a private 
sector firm under contract with the parish government. 
Typically, when the parish government contracts out RSC 
(option 3 above) to a private sector firm, the parish 
government levies a parish-wide sales tax to cover the 
cost of RSC. Under the parish option there is no 
transfer of monies between the municipal government and 
the parish government. Because there is no transaction 
reflected in the municipal accounting records under the 
parish arrangement, municipalities using this mode of 
RSC are not considered in this study.
A total of 184 municipalities (61%) responded to 
the survey. Table 5-1 shows the breakdown of the 
responding municipalities by RSC arrangement. Municipal
and contract account for 52% of the responding 
municipalities. Of the 184 responding municipalities 96 
fall into the two groups of interest (i.e., municipal 
and contract). Thus a 32% usable response rate was 
obtained.
TABLE 5-1
BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS BY RSC ARRANGEMENT
Percent of Percent of 
All Surveys Usable
Arrangement_______ Number_________ Returned________ Returns
Municipal 43 23% 45%
Contract 53 29% 55%
Parish 72 39% -
Other 16 9% -
Totals 184 100% 100%
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics aid in identifying the 
location, spread, and shape of the underlying 
distribution of a variable. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present 
descriptive statistics for demographic and independent 
variables respectively. From these tables it is evident 
that there is much variation in the data. Also, many of 
the variables appear to come from skewed distributions. 
Prior to formal testing, it appears that municipalities 
that privatize RSC are larger in terms of population,
the number of households, and the number of municipal 
employees.
TABLE 5-2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Standard
Variable________ Mean_____ Deviation Min._____ Max.
Population
Municipal 12,738 36,055 430 217,842
Contract 25,608 91,524 438 556,913
Households
Municipal 4,215 11,630 97 70,000
Contract 8,602 31,426 154 200,000
Employees
Municipal 147 411 1 2,382
Contract 251 952 4 5,991
From Table 5-3, total tax revenues per household 
(TAXREV) appear higher in municipalities that contract 
RSC. In addition, the cost of RSC per household is 
considerably lower in contract municipalities. This 
result is to be expected since one of the most cited 
reasons for privatization is the cost savings generated. 
It is interesting to note that the standard deviation 
for REFUSE under the municipal arrangement is quite a 
bit larger than under the contract arrangement. This 
finding suggests that the price charged by private 
sector firms is relatively more stable than RSC costs 
under the municipal arrangement. This price stability 
under the contract arrangement is probably due to the
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TABLE 5-3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Standard
Variable_________ Mean_____ Deviation Min._______ Max.
TAXREV
Municipal 333.08 282.01 16.37 1,410.10
Contract 486.62 294.47 37.84 1,220.83
REFUSE
Municipal 82.14 44.59 13.80 212.68
Contract 67.34 25.99 6.81 144.09
PROPERTY
Municipal 83.96 124.50 0.00 734.83
Contract 101.47 193.43 0.00 1,403.28
DEBT
Municipal 318.74 575.30 0.00 2,631.06
Contract 389.49 566.71 0.00 2,718.52
GRANTS
Municipal 154.96 321.94 0.00 2,026.17
Contract 145.59 449.98 0.00 3,158.74
PCTEMP
Municipal 0.92 0.51 0.13 2.41
Contract 0.88 0.40 0.22 2.53
FREQ
Municipal 1.51 0.55 1.00 3.00
Contract 1.70 0.46 1.00 2.00
USERFEE
Municipal 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
Contract 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00
NEWORL
Municipal 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Contract 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
competitive market environment that private sector firms 
operate in. That is, private sector firms are "price 
takers." The variability observed under the municipal 
arrangement may be due to the lack of competition in the 
governmental environment. Bureaucrats are able to set 
their "prices" without the influence of the competitive 
market. Therefore, the cost of a particular service 
(e.g., RSC) in different municipalities may vary 
considerably.
Intergovernmental revenues per household (GRANTS) 
are about the same for both contract and municipal 
communities. The same is true for the number of 
municipal employees expressed as a percentage of total 
population (PCTEMP). In the next section a t-test is 
used to formally compare municipal and contract 
communities with respect to each of the demographic and 
independent variables.
Inferential Statistics
Inferential statistics are concerned with making 
generalizations about a population from the results 
obtained from a sample (Lang and Heiss 1977, 2). In 
this section, municipal and contract communities are 
compared with respect to each of the demographic and 
independent variables. The hypotheses tested in this 
section seek to determine if municipalities that 
privatize RSC exhibit demographic and financial
characteristics that are significantly different from 
those that do not privatize RSC. The alpha level for 
determining statistical significance in this study is 
.10.
A two-sample t-test is a powerful technique for 
testing the hypothesis that the difference between the 
means of two groups is statistically significant. The 
accuracy of the two-sample t-test is dependent upon two 
key assumptions: (1) each of the populations are 
normally distributed, and (2) the variance for each of 
the populations are equal (Hays 1981, 286). According 
to Hays (1981, 287) the t-test is generally robust 
against departures from normality. However, the lack of 
homogeneity of variance is critical when comparing 
groups of unequal size. When unequal sample sizes are 
compared and the equality of population variances cannot 
be assumed, a correction for the number of degrees of 
freedom is recommended (Hays 1981, 287). The SAS TTEST 
procedure provides an F-test of the null hypothesis that 
the population variances are equal. In addition, a t- 
statistic and corresponding significance level is 
calculated under the assumption of equal variances as 
well as under the assumption of unequal variances. The 
t-statistic under the assumption of unequal variances 
incorporates a calculation for the number of degrees of
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freedom similar to the correction recommended by Hays 
(1981, 287).
T-test results for each of the demographic 
variables are shown in table 5-4. The results indicate 
that the two groups are not significantly different with 
respect to: (1) total population, (2) the number of 
households, and (3) the number of municipal employees.
TABLE 5-4





Municipal 43 12,738 36,055 -0.9380 0.3515
Contract 53 25,608 91,524
Households
Municipal 43 4,215 11,630 -0.9401 0.3505
Contract 53 8,602 31,426
Employees
Municipal 43 147 411 -0.7148 0.4770
Contract 53 251 952
Table 5-5 presents the t-test results for all 
independent variables included in the logit model. The 
results indicate that municipalities that privatize RSC 
have significantly higher tax revenues per household 
(TAXREV), significantly lower RSC costs per household 
(REFUSE), receive a significantly higher level of RSC 
services (FREQ), and are more likely to be from the 
metropolitan New Orleans area (NEWORL).
TABLE 5—5























Municipal 43 318.74 575.30
Contract 53 389.49 566.71
-0.6042
GRANTS
Municipal 43 154.96 321.94




































The findings indicate that the voters in 
municipalities that privatize RSC face a greater tax 
burden (TAXREV) than voters in municipalities using 
municipal RSC. This result is consistent with the a 
priori notion that voters faced with higher tax levels 
become politically active and pressure politicians to 
reduce government spending levels (e.g., privatize 
services).
The t-test of the difference in the cost of RSC per 
household (REFUSE) for the two groups of municipalities 
indicates that contract RSC is significantly less costly 
than municipal RSC. This result supports the a priori 
notion that private sector production is less costly 
than public sector production. However, this 
statistical test does not hold constant other factors 
that may influence the cost of RSC. For example, higher 
municipal RSC could be caused by the provision of a 
higher level of services than contract RSC. Therefore, 
it is inappropriate to conclude from a t-test alone that 
private sector production is necessarily less costly 
than public sector production.
T-test results indicate that municipalities that 
privatize RSC receive a higher level of services (FREQ) 
than those that do not privatize RSC. This is 
consistent with the a priori notion that private sector 
producers provide higher service levels than public
sector producers. Combining the findings for REFUSE and 
FREQ leads to the conclusion that private sector firms 
provide a higher level of RSC services at lower costs 
(including profit) than public sector employees.
In Louisiana, New Orleans is the largest 
metropolitan area and therefore may possess 
characteristics that are different from other 
municipalities in the state. The dummy variable NEWORL 
is included in the model to capture any systematic 
differences between municipalities in the New Orleans 
area and those outside the New Orleans area. The 
results indicate that contract RSC is more likely for 
municipalities in the metropolitan New Orleans area.
A t-test comparing communities that privatize RSC 
to those that do not privatize RSC indicates that no 
statistically significant differences exist with respect 
to: (1) the amount of property tax revenues generated by 
the average household (PROPERTY), (2) the amount of 
general obligation bonds outstanding per household 
(DEBT), (3) the amount of intergovernmental revenues per 
household (GRANTS), (4) the ratio of municipal employees 
(minus RSC employees) to total population (PCTEMP), and 
(5) the use of RSC user fees (USERFEE).
These results indicate that the amount of 
additional funds available to the bureaucrat (PROPERTY, 
DEBT, and GRANTS) are not significantly different in
municipal vs. contract communities. The finding that 
the difference in PCTEMP is not significantly different 
suggests that municipal employees in municipal RSC 
communities possess no more political clout than 
municipal employees in contract RSC communities. A 
dummy variable, USERFEE, is included in the model to 
represent the existence of a RSC user fee. A user fee 
makes the cost of RSC explicit to voters. T-test 
results indicate that contract RSC communities are no 
more likely to assess a RSC user fee than municipal RSC 
communities.
Tests of the Model 
In this study, the dependent variable is the method 
of RSC. Two RSC arrangements are considered: (1) 
municipal RSC, and (2) contract RSC. Nine hypotheses 
are tested regarding the extent to which municipal 
accounting data is useful for modeling the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Logit is an appropriate 
method of determining the simultaneous effect of several 
independent variables upon a dichotomous dependent 
variable. As in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis, multicollinearity among the independent 
variables included in a logit model can cause 
significant problems in the interpretation of the 
results. Therefore, the first step in the analysis is
to assess the degree of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables in the logit model.
Two methods are used to assess the degree of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables.
First, Pearson product moment correlations are used to 
evaluate whether the independent variables in the model 
are highly correlated with each other (i.e., bivariate 
correlations). Second, to assess whether one 
independent variable can be expressed as a linear 
combination of several of the others, each independent 
variable is regressed, in turn, on the remaining 
independent variables.
Tests for Detecting Multicollinearity
Stone and Rasp (1991, 173) identify collinear 
predictor variables as one problem typically encountered 
in accounting research. While collinearity among 
independent variables is prevalent in accounting 
studies, the correlations need to be fairly high (i.e., 
0.70 or larger) before they present a serious problem. 
Table 5-6 presents the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficients and associated significance 
levels for all continuous independent variables in the 
logit model. While several of the correlations are 
statistically significant, the correlation coefficients 
are low to moderate. None of the correlations in Table 
5-6 are close to 0.70.
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TABLE 5-6
PEARSON'S PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS





























OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY
Dependent
Variable df F-Value p-Value R-Scruare
TAXREV 87 8.58 .0001 .4410
REFUSE 87 1.24 .2850 .1025
PROPERTY 87 5.99 .0001 .3552
DEBT 87 4.76 .0001 .3044
GRANTS 87 0.45 .8887 .0396
PCTEMP 87 0.55 .8145 .0483
FREQ 87 1.49 .1723 .1205
USERFEE 87 1.18 .3229 .0976
NEWORL 87 1.78 .0921 .1406
Table 5-7 presents the coefficient of multiple 
determination (R2) for the multiple regressions when 
each independent variable is regressed on the remaining 
independent variables. An R2 close to 1.00 for any of 
these multiple regression equations would indicate 
significant multicollinearity. While several of the 
multiple regressions are statistically significant, the 
R"Squares are low to moderate. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients of the logit model do not appear to be 
impaired by the effects of multicollinearity.
Logit Results
Public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy 
are used to derive hypotheses concerning the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Municipal accounting 
information is used to operationalize these hypotheses.
A logit model is used to test the extent to which 
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the 
decision to privatize RSC. The dependent variable in 
the logit model is the method of RSC (METHOD). The 
usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling the 
decision to privatize RSC is judged by a chi-square test 
of the null hypotheses that all coefficients for the 
independent variables included in the model equal zero. 
Rejection of this hypothesis is empirical evidence that 
at least one, and possibly all, of the independent 
variables is related to the privatization decision.
Each of the individual coefficients are tested for 
statistical significance using a chi-square test. In 
addition, the sign of each coefficient is compared to 
the a priori predicted sign. A sign in the predicted 
direction suggests that the theoretical model is capable 
of not only identifying variables but also predicting 
the direction of their effect on the privatization 
decision. Table 5-8 summarizes the results of the logit 
model.
The statistical significance of the overall model 
is determined by the value of the -2 Log L.R. statistic. 
This statistic is interpreted in the same manner as an 
F-test in an ordinary least squares regression. That 
is, the null hypothesis is that all of the coefficients 
in the model are equal to zero. The value of the -2 Log 
L.R. statistic (p = .0003) leads to a rejection of the 
null hypothesis and indicates that the overall model is 
useful for explaining the decision to privatize RSC. To 
draw more conclusive inferences regarding the usefulness 
of municipal accounting data for modeling the decision 
to privatize RSC, the null hypothesis that each 
coefficient equals zero is tested. An interpretation of 
the sign and significance of each of the independent 
variables in the model follows.
The variable TAXREV (total tax revenues divided by 
the number of households) is a measure of the tax burden
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TABLE 5-8 








TAXREV + 0.0047 0.0014 10.75 0.0010
REFUSE + -0.0277 0.0095 8.55 0.0035
PROPERTY - -0.0031 0.0019 2.68 0.1016
DEBT - -0.0008 0.0006 1.91 0.1671
GRANTS ■? -0.0001 0.0006 0.01 0.9212
PCTEMP - -0.6561 0.5772 1.29 0.2557
FREQ + 0.9118 0.5226 3.04 0.0810
USERFEE + 0.7518 0.6870 1.20 0.2738
NEWORL + 2.1745 0.9083 5.73 0.0167
CONSTANT •? -0.8881 1.0152 0.77 0.3817
Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 30.62 df.= 86 
(-2 Log L.R.) p = .0003
Classification Table For the Logit Model
Predicted 
Municipal Contract Total
Municipal 29 14 43
Contract 12 41 53
Total | 41 | 55 | 96
False positive rate: 25.5% 
False negative rate: 29.3%
upon voters. The notion that voters respond to an 
increasing tax burden by pressuring politicians to 
implement more efficient methods of service delivery 
(e.g., privatization) is supported by the positive sign 
and statistical significance of the coefficient for 
TAXREV. The positive sign for this coefficient suggests 
that the probability of privatization increases as the 
tax burden per household increases. This result is 
consistent with the a priori expectation based on the 
public choice model that states voters become 
politically active when faced with an increasing tax 
burden. The null hypothesis that the coefficient for 
this variable is equal to zero is rejected (p = .0010).
The coefficient for the variable REFUSE (cost of 
RSC per household) is significant (p = .0035). However 
the sign of this variable is opposite that of the a 
priori predicted direction. That is, the empirical 
results indicate that the probability of privatization 
decreases as the cost of RSC increases. This finding is 
unexpected since one of the most common reasons for 
considering privatization is the expected cost savings.
A possible reason for this finding is that higher RSC 
costs are associated with municipal collection13.
13The unexpected sign of this coefficient may be 
due to the possible endogeneity of REFUSE to the model. 
That is, the cost of RSC may influence the decision to 
privatize, and privatization may impact on the cost of 
RSC. Therefore, the relationship between REFUSE and the
DEBT (general obligation bonds outstanding divided 
by the number of households) is a proxy for additional 
funds available to the bureaucrat. As the level of debt 
outstanding increases, bureaucrats have more funds with 
which to engage in "empire building" and other 
inefficient activities. Therefore, a priori, as DEBT 
increases, the probability of privatization decreases 
(i.e., the sign for this coefficient should be 
negative). The results indicate that the coefficient 
for this variable is negative but insignificant 
(p = .1671). Therefore, the null hypothesis that this 
coefficient is equal to zero cannot be rejected.
There are two possible reasons for DEBT not being 
statistically significant. First, DEBT may not be a 
good proxy for additional funds available to the 
bureaucrat. Second, additional funds available to the 
bureaucrat may not impact on the privatization decision. 
If DEBT is not a good proxy for additional funds 
available to the bureaucrat a better proxy must be 
found. However, if additional funds available to the 
bureaucrat do not impact on the privatization decision, 
the theoretical framework needs to be re-examined. 
Additional research is necessary to gain a better
decision to privatize RSC may be mutually dependent. To 
account for this possibility, the equation is re- 
estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) procedure. 
The results of the IV procedure are reported in Table 5-
9.
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understanding of how (if) this variable influences the 
privatization decision.
The coefficient for the variable GRANTS 
(intergovernmental revenues divided by the number of 
households) is negative but insignificant (p = .9212).
No prediction was made a priori regarding the direction 
of the sign for this variable. The negative sign 
suggests that as revenues received from 
intergovernmental sources increase the probability of 
privatization decreases. This is consistent with the 
notion that GRANTS is a proxy for additional funds 
available to the bureaucrat. Because these funds do not 
come from the local taxpayers, a bureaucrat is able to 
engage in "empire building" (e.g., employ municipal 
workers for RSC) and other inefficient activities 
without political pressure. As stated above for DEBT, 
two possible reasons exist for GRANTS not being 
significant. First, GRANTS may not be a good proxy for 
additional funds available to the bureaucrat. Second, 
additional funds available to the bureaucrat may not 
influence the decision to privatize RSC. Additional 
research is necessary to determine how (if) GRANTS 
impacts the privatization decision.
Municipal employees represent a group of voters 
with a vested interest in thwarting any attempt to 
privatize municipal services. The variable PCTEMP is
calculated by dividing the number of municipal employees 
(less RSC employees) by the total population of the 
municipality. The coefficient for this variable is 
negative but insignificant (p = .2557). The negative 
sign suggests that the probability of privatization 
decreases as the proportion of the population composed 
of municipal employees increases. The insignificance of 
PCTEMP may be due to the exceptionally small percentages 
obtained for PCTEMP. The highest value for PCTEMP 
(2.5%), is associated with contract RSC. However, the 
next two highest values for PCTEMP (2.4% and 2.1%), are 
associated with municipal RSC. It is difficult for such 
a small group of voters to have much influence on local 
politicians. The value of PCTEMP may need to be greater 
than some threshold level before it becomes 
statistically significant.
The variable FREQ is equal to the number of 
residential sanitation collections per week and is a 
proxy for service level. This variable is included in 
the model to control for any systematic differences in 
RSC service level. The results support the a priori 
prediction that communities requiring a higher level of 
RSC service are more likely to privatize RSC. The 
results also support the notion that service level is a 
factor in the privatization decision since the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient for this variable is
equal to zero is rejected (p = .0810).
A dummy variable representing the use of a RSC user 
fee (USERFEE) is included in the model to capture the 
effect of making the cost of RSC explicit to the voters. 
Voters are more likely to demand efficient operations if 
they are aware of the cost of those operations. The 
results indicate that USERFEE does not impact the 
decision to privatize RSC. One explanation for this 
finding is that most (85%) of the municipalities in the 
sample assess a RSC userfee (90% of contract and 79% of 
municipal). Another possible explanation for this 
finding is that taxpayers do not pressure politicians to 
engage in cost reduction measures (e.g., privatization) 
based on the cost of a single service. That is, voters 
look at the size of the government as a whole, not the 
individual parts when deciding to become politically 
active. The null hypothesis that the coefficient for 
this variable is equal to zero cannot be rejected 
(p = .2738).
NEWORL is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if 
a municipality is located in the metropolitan New 
Orleans area and assigned a value of 0 otherwise. New 
Orleans is the largest metropolitan area in Louisiana.
It is possible that municipalities within the New 
Orleans metropolitan area possess characteristics that 
are systematically different from other municipalities
within Louisiana. Therefore, the variable NEWORL is 
included in the model to capture any systematic 
differences that may exist because of a municipality's 
proximity to the New Orleans area.
The coefficient for NEWORL is positive and 
significant (p = .0167). Therefore, cities that are 
located in the metropolitan New Orleans area are more 
likely to privatize RSC than those outside the New 
Orleans area. This result may be an indication that 
there are some economies of scale available to private 
sector firms operating in large metropolitan areas. 
Economies of scale may exist because private sector 
firms do not need to recognize political boundaries 
(Spann 1977, 89). Therefore, private sector firm can 
choose an optimal level of operation in an area with a 
large number of potential customers. Another reason for 
a higher propensity to privatize RSC in metropolitan 
areas may be the level of demand for public services 
that is characteristic of large metropolitan areas.
That is, the demand for public sector services in large 
metropolitan areas may be greater than the capacity of 
the public sector service system. One method to 
alleviate this strain is to contract services out to 
private sector firms. The empirical results support the 
a priori prediction for this coefficient.
The results of the logit analysis indicate that the
overall model is significant (-2 Log L.R. p = .0003). 
This is interpreted as evidence that municipal 
accounting data is useful for modeling the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Further, rejection of the 
null hypothesis for individual coefficients is possible 
for five of nine independent variables. These results 
should be considered in the context of a recent study by 
Stone and Rasp (1991) that used a Monte Carlo simulation 
to evaluate the effect of sample size, the distribution 
of data, and collinearity among independent variables on 
logit error rates. Their results indicate that when 
sample sizes are small (less than 200 observations), and 
data is skewed, the null hypothesis for individual 
parameter estimates are falsely rejected less frequently 
than the alpha level indicates. However, the null 
hypothesis that the overall model has no explanatory 
power is falsely rejected more often than the alpha 
level indicates. This leads to the conclusion that when 
sample size is small and data is skewed (as in the 
present study), tests of the individual coefficients 
tend to be conservatively biased, while a test of the 
overall model may produce a result that is overly 
optimistic.
The classification table included in Table 5-8 
indicates that 72.9% of the observations in the original 
data set are classified correctly by the logit model.
This is better than the rate resulting from the use of a 
naive model that classifies all municipalities as 
contract (55.2%). Caution must be used when 
interpreting this result however. If this model is 
applied to a new data set, a similar level of accuracy 
may or may not be achieved.
REFUSE may, to some degree, be determined by the 
dependent variable METHOD. To address the possibility 
of REFUSE being endogenous, the logit model is re- 
estimated using an instrumental variable (IV)- procedure. 
The IV technique is a two-stage process. In the first 
stage, an ordinary least squares regression is performed 
with REFUSE as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables (i.e., instruments) consist of data obtained 
from the survey instrument. In the second stage, the 
predicted values from the first stage ordinary least 
squares regression (REFUSE2) are entered into the 
original logit model. Table 5-9 presents the results of 
the IV procedure.
A comparison of the re-estimated logit results with 
the original logit results suggests that REFUSE is not 
endogenous to the model. In the original model the 
coefficient of REFUSE is negative and significant 
(p = .0035). In the re-estimated model, the coefficient 
of REFUSE2 is also negative and significant. In
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TABLE 5-9








TAXREV + 0.0044 0.0015 8.76 0.0031
REFUSE2 + -0.0333 0.0194 2.95 0.0859
PROPERTY - -0.0027 0.0019 1.91 0.1673
DEBT - -0.0006 0.0005 1.43 0.2317
GRANTS ? -0.0000 0.0006 0.00 0.9775
PCTEMP - -0.4550 0.5428 0.70 0.4019
FREQ + 0.8451 0.4927 2.94 0.0863
USERFEE + 0.5578 0.6702 0.69 0.4053
NEWORL + 1.8667 0.8229 5.15 0.0233
CONSTANT ? -0.3809 1.2605 0.09 0.7625
Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 21.26 df.= 84 
(-2 Log L.R.) p = 0.0115.














Total 42 52 94
False positive rate: 28.8%
False negative rate: 35.7%
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addition, all insignificant variables in the original 
model remain insignificant in the re-estimated model.
All significant variables in the original model retain 
their algebraic sign in the re-estimated model. Only 
one significant variable (PROPERTY) in the original 
model (p = .1016) becomes insignificant in the re- 
estimated model (it does however retain the same 
algebraic sign).
The results of the re-estimated model are 
reassuring. The endogeneity of REFUSE would be 
suggested if: (1) the magnitude of the coefficients in 
the re-estimated model changed radically from the 
coefficients in the original model, (2) the algebraic 
sign of the coefficients in the original model changed 
in the re-estimated model, and (3) significant 
(insignificant) coefficients in the original model 
became insignificant (significant) in the re-estimated 
model. The results of the IV procedure suggest that the 
estimates obtained from the original model are robust 
with respect to the possibility of REFUSE being 
endogenous to the model.
Summary
This chapter presents the results of this study.
The evidence suggests that municipal accounting data is 
useful in modeling the municipal decision to privatize 
RSC. More generally, the theoretical framework that is
used in this study may be useful for suggesting 
municipal accounting data to model a variety of public 
resource allocation decisions. Table 5-10 presents a 




SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS 
Null Hypothesis_____________________
H]_: Ceteris paribus, RSC costs per house­
hold do not affect the decision to 
privatize RSC.
H2 : Ceteris paribus, total tax revenues
per household do not affect the 
decision to privatize RSC.
H3 : Ceteris paribus, the amount of property
tax revenues generated by the average 
household does not affect the decision 
to privatize RSC.
H4 : Ceteris paribus, the amount of general
obligation bonded debt outstanding per 
household does not affect the decision 
privatize RSC.
H5 : Ceteris paribus, the amount of inter­
governmental revenues per household do 
not affect the decision to privatize 
RSC.
Hg: Ceteris paribus, the ratio of the
number of municipal employees (less 
RSC employees) to total population 
does not affect the decision to 
privatize RSC.
H7 : Ceteris paribus, the frequency of RSC
does not affect the decision to 
privatize RSC.
H8 : Ceteris paribus, the assessment of a
RSC user fee does not affect the 
decision to privatize RSC.
Hg: Ceteris paribus, the geographic
proximity of a municipality to the 
metropolitan New Orleans area does 























This chapter summarizes the study and describes the 
contribution it makes to the existing body of accounting 
literature. The first section provides a brief overview 
of the study. The second section discusses the 
implications of the empirical results. The third 
section outlines the limitations of the study. The 
final section offers suggestions for future research.
Summary of the Study 
This study investigates the determinants of the 
municipal decision to privatize residential sanitation 
collection (RSC). Louisiana municipalities were 
surveyed to obtain data regarding the method of RSC as 
well as certain financial and demographic information. 
This study examines two methods of RSC: (1) municipal—  
where RSC is carried out by municipal employees, and (2) 
contract— where RSC is carried out by a private sector 
firm under contract with a municipality. Public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy guide the selection 
of municipal accounting data useful for modeling the 
municipal decision to privatize RSC. Nine hypotheses
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derived from public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy are tested using logistic regression (logit) 
analysis. The logit model is statistically significant. 
In addition, five of the nine independent variables are 
statistically significant. These results indicate that 
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the 
municipal decision to privatize RSC.
Implications
One of the most common reasons for privatizing RSC 
is the cost savings that result from private sector 
production. Many studies find support for the 
hypothesis that contract RSC is less costly than 
municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978; 
Bennett & Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; and Berenyi & 
Stevens 1988). However, most of these studies 
investigate municipalities with more than 25,000 
residents. The effect of privatizing RSC in small 
municipalities (population under 10,000) has received 
little attention in the literature, primarily due to the 
lack of data availability for small municipalities. The 
present study uses data from Louisiana municipalities, 
the majority of which are small (population under 
10,000). The results of this research are consistent 
with prior research indicating that the cost of RSC is 
significantly lower for contract RSC.
Prior research regarding public resource allocation 
decisions uses public choice theory and/or the theory of 
bureaucracy to guide the selection of independent 
variables. Typically, these studies use socioeconomic 
data to operationalize the independent variables. One 
problem with socioeconomic data is that it is not always 
available on a timely basis (e.g., Census of Government 
data is only published every five years). In general, 
municipal accounting data is prepared at least annually. 
Therefore, municipal accounting data provide a more 
timely source of information for researchers 
investigating public resource allocation decisions.
In the present study public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy guide the selection of municipal 
accounting data useful for modeling the decision to 
privatize RSC. The results indicate that municipal 
accounting data are useful for modeling the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Therefore, public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy appear to provide a 
useful theoretical framework for accounting researchers 
interested in investigating public resource allocation 
decisions.
The results of this study support the notion that 
voters react to the burden of taxation. When the tax 
burden per household increases, the probability of 
privatization increases. This finding suggests that
voters become politically active and put pressure upon 
politicians to reduce taxes as their tax burden 
increases. To decrease the tax burden upon their 
constituents, politicians may attempt to lessen the need 
for additional tax revenues by reducing the level of 
government expenditures. One method to reduce public 
expenditures is to provide services at the lowest 
possible cost, and privatization of RSC is one method of 
reducing the cost of RSC. The empirical results suggest 
that municipal accounting data reflect the behavior of 
voters faced with an increase in their tax burden. 
Furthermore, municipal accounting data also reflects the 
behavior of politicians faced with dissatisfied voters.
The opportunity costs of becoming informed about 
political issues and of voting are higher for wealthy 
individuals. Therefore, a greater degree of perceived 
government waste and a higher level of tax burden is 
necessary before voters in wealthy communities become 
politically active. Bureaucrats in wealthy communities 
are able to exploit this political apathy by engaging in 
"empire building" and other inefficient activities 
(e.g., municipal RSC instead of contract RSC). The 
results of this study support the notion that wealthy 
communities require a greater level of discontent before 
becoming politically active.
The assessment of a user fee makes the cost of RSC 
explicit to the voter. A priori, it was expected that 
knowledge of the cost of RSC would motivate voters to 
become politically active and demand that RSC be 
provided at minimum cost (i.e., privatized). However, 
the results suggest that the existence of a user fee 
does not impact the decision to privatize RSC. The 
reason for this situation may be that the cost of a 
single service (e.g., RSC) is not enough to motivate 
voters to become politically active (i.e., it does not 
force them out of their range of indifference). This 
finding suggests that voters base their evaluation of 
local officials on overall performance rather than on a 
particular issue.
In general, the population density of 
municipalities in large metropolitan areas is higher 
than those outside of large metropolitan areas. Higher 
population density puts a strain on service providers 
(i.e., municipal governments). One way to alleviate 
this strain is to contract out certain services to the 
private sector (e.g., RSC). The results show that large 
metropolitan areas are more likely to privatize RSC.
The results of this study support some conclusions 
of prior research and refute others. Ferris (1986) 
finds that as the tax burden upon residents increases, 
the percentage of publicly provided services contracted
out increases. The present study supports this finding. 
Alternatively, Ferris (1986) finds that as 
intergovernmental revenues (e.g., state and federal 
grants) as a percent of total revenues increase, the 
percentage of municipal services contracted out 
increases. According to the present study, 
intergovernmental revenues do not significantly affect 
the decision to privatize RSC.
Ferris (1986) also finds municipal employees as a 
percent of total population significant in the decision 
to contract out services; as the ratio of public 
employees to total population increases, the percentage 
of services contracted out decreases. This finding 
suggests that public employees are able to thwart 
attempts to privatize municipal services as their 
political clout increases (i.e., as the ratio of 
municipal employees to total population increases).
The present study does not support the contention 
that public employees possess a significant amount of 
political clout. This finding is probably due to the 
small size (population under 10,000) of the 
municipalities in the sample. Some municipalities have 
so few public employees that even if they vote as a 
group, they possess no more political clout than a 
single voter.
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From a theoretical perspective, public employees 
possess more political clout than the average resident 
because they tend to be more politically active (Bennett 
and Orzechowski 1983). This by itself does not 
guarantee political power however, since the number of 
individuals in the group needs to be sufficiently large 
to render the group politically effective. Additional 
research is necessary to determine how large a group 
must be, relative to all voters, before it can 
effectively wield political power in privatization 
decisions.
A factor not in the model of the decision to 
privatize RSC is the effect of municipal employee 
unions. Theoretically, municipal employee unions oppose 
privatization on the grounds that privatization causes 
municipal employees to lose their jobs. However, the 
number of unionized employees must be sufficiently large 
to wield any political power. While it is proper to 
include a union variable in the model on theoretical 
grounds, Louisiana municipalities have very little 
unionization.
The major conclusion of this study is that public 
resource allocation decisions are impounded in the 
municipal accounting numbers, making it possible to 
assess the accountability of public officials.
Therefore, municipal accounting data meet one of the
three broad objectives set forth in GASB Concepts 
Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting. 
Furthermore, public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy provide the theoretical underpinnings 
necessary to develop models of public resource 
allocation decisions using municipal accounting data.
One of the major functions of municipal accounting 
is to accurately report financial transactions affecting 
a municipality. One of the major functions of 
government accountants is to decide which information to 
report. According to GASB Concepts Statement No. 1 
(GASB 1987, 27), ’’Financial reporting should assist in 
fulfilling government's duty to be publicly accountable 
and should enable users to assess that accountability." 
Accordingly, government accountants must report 
information that allows users to assess the performance 
of public officials. Public choice theory and the 
theory of bureaucracy are both well established models 
of how decisions are made in the public sector. 
Therefore, governmental financial reports should reflect 
public resource allocation decisions that are consistent 
with public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy. 
The statistical analyses of the present study 
demonstrate that municipal accounting data does indeed, 
for the privatization decision, reflect relevant 
information underlying public resource allocation
decisions. The main contribution of this study lies in 
establishing public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy as the critical linchpin that connects 
municipal accounting data to public resource allocation 
decisions.
The results of this study may be useful to the GASB 
in setting governmental accounting standards. The GASB 
can look to public choice theory and the theory of 
bureaucracy to guide the development of reporting 
standards which accurately reflect public resource 
allocation decisions. Accounting academicians will also 
benefit from the methodological contributions of this 
study. Academicians investigating public resource 
allocation decisions should consider using public choice 
theory and the theory of bureaucracy to link those 
decisions to specific accounting variables.
The results of this study suggest that municipal 
accounting data may by useful to private sector firms 
attempting to target municipalities that are good 
prospects (i.e., "ripe") for privatization. For 
example, a private firm may use the level of total taxes 
per household as an indicator of communities that are 
more likely to privatize. Alternatively, the logit 
model developed in this study may be used to identify 
prospects for privatization. The logit model calculates 
the probability that a municipality privatizes RSC.
This probability is then used to classify each 
municipality as either privatized or municipal. 
Municipalities incorrectly classified as privatized are 
those that, according to the model, should be 
privatized. Therefore, municipalities incorrectly 
classified as privatized represent good prospects for 
privatization.
The results of this study also suggest that 
municipal accounting data provide information useful to 
users such as bond underwriters and bond rating 
agencies. Bond underwriters and bond rating agencies 
need data that accurately reflects the financial 
dealings of a municipality. The results of this study 
suggest that municipal accounting data reflect decisions 
that impact the financial status of a municipality. 
Further, the results suggest that the decision to 
privatize RSC may be a signal regarding the quality of 
management in a municipality. That is, it appear^ that 
the decision to privatize RSC is typically made in 
response to voters becoming politically active.
Political activity by voters is typically motivated by 
the tax burden placed upon voters. Therefore, bond 
rating agencies and bond underwriters may view 
privatization as a signal that voters will not be 
favorably disposed to future tax increases necessary to 
service general obligation debt.
Finally, the results of this study suggest that 
municipal accounting data provides information useful to 
government officials who are considering whether or not 
to privatize government services. Since municipal 
accounting data provides indicators or signals regarding 
when privatization is likely, the financial 
characteristics of one municipality can be compared to 
those of another municipality to aid in deciding when to 
engage in privatization.
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that the results 
may not be generalizable to municipalities outside 
Louisiana. To the extent that the political structure 
and decision making approach used in Louisiana differ 
systematically from municipalities outside Louisiana, 
the results of this study are not relevant to 
municipalities outside Louisiana. However, the findings 
of this study are consistent with the theoretical model. 
Therefore, the application of the model used in this 
study to a different data set should yield similar 
results.
Another limitation is that the research design of 
this study is by necessity quasi-experimental. Two 
important characteristics of quasi-experimental research 
are (1) the absence of random assignment of subjects to 
experimental and control groups, and (2) the inability
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of the researcher to manipulate independent variables.
In this study, municipalities self-select themselves 
into one of two groups (i.e., municipal RSC or contract 
RSC). Therefore, self-selection bias may have been 
present. In addition, the degree of causality that can 
be attributed to the independent variables is limited 
because the independent variables were not manipulated 
by the researcher in this study.
Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this study provide many directions 
for future accounting research. First, the model used 
in this study should be employed to investigate the 
municipal decision to privatize other municipal 
services. This would provide empirical evidence of the 
robustness of the model. Second, public choice theory 
and/or the theory of bureaucracy should be used to 
suggest municipal accounting data useful for modeling 
public resource allocation decisions other than 
privatization.
In this study, the amount of additional funds 
available to the bureaucrat (GRANTS and DEBT) was not a 
significant factor with respect to the municipal 
decision to privatize RSC. Future research should 
attempt to determine whether GRANTS and DEBT are simply 
poor proxies for additional funds available to the 
bureaucrat, or if additional funds available to the
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bureaucrat do in fact impact on the privatization 
decision.
According to the theoretical framework employed in 
this study, the probability of privatization should 
increase as the cost of RSC per household (REFUSE) 
rises. However, the empirical findings are the opposite 
of the a priori expectation. Future research should 
attempt to determine whether the negative sign of the 
REFUSE coefficient is an anomalous result.
According to Millar (1983, 192) a significant 
number of municipalities abandon contract RSC and return 
to municipal RSC. Future research should attempt to 
determine why municipalities abandon privatization. In 
addition, future research should compare the financial 
characteristics of municipalities that abandon 
privatization with the financial characteristics of 
those that do not abandon privatization. Public choice 
theory and/or the theory of bureaucracy may be useful 
for investigating these questions.
Savas (1979) suggests that municipalities 
understate the "true" cost of municipal RSC. Future 
research should investigate how municipal accounting 
systems can be modified so that all relevant costs are 
included in the calculation of the cost of municipal 
services. A study of the true costs of providing
municipal services would presumably be useful to GASB in 
the standard setting process.
Private sector firms sometimes submit low bids 
(i.e., low ball) to secure government contracts. After 
the initial contract period, the contract price is then 
increased. Future research should attempt to determine 
whether the cost savings associated with privatization 
decrease over time and whether the existence of 
competition in the private sector provides a measure of 
control for the phenomenon of low balling.
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TO CITY CLERKS/MUNICIPAL FINANCE DIRECTORS
The Office of the L eg i s l a t i v e  Auditor i s  coopera t ing with a Louisiana 
S ta te  Un iver s i ty  graduate  s tudent  in conducting a study of r e s id e n t i a l  so l id  
waste ( i . e . ,  household garbage) c o l l e c t i o n .  This s tudy i s  f o r  a doctoral  
d i s s e r t a t i o n  designed to help in understanding the methods and cos t s  of r e s i ­
den t i a l  s o l i d  waste c o l l e c t i o n  in  use in Loui s iana .  Data f o r  t h i s  study i s  
being compiled ( a t  no c o s t  to the s t a t e )  by Mr. Rich Brooks a t  Louisiana 
S ta te  U nive r s i ty .
Mr. Brooks r e q u es t s  t h a t  you r e f e r  to  the enclosed one page "Explanation
of  Terms" which de f in e s  terms as they are used in t h i s  s tudy.  Reference to
t h i s  page wi l l  assure  t h a t  the data submitted by a l l  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  wi ll  be 
comparable.  P lease complete t h i s  r epo r t  and forward d i r e c t l y  to Mr. Brooks 
by Ju ly  31,  1990. Simply fo ld the r e po r t  as i n d i c a t e d  and s t a p l e  once so 
t h a t  the  postage-paid  business  reply  address i s  showing.
Any quest ions regarding t h i s  r e p o r t  should be d i r e c t e d  to  Rich Brooks a t  
(504) 388-6221 o r  (504 ) 769-7096. I f  you would l i k e  a summary copy of the
r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  s tudy,  p lace an "X" in  the space below. Thank you very much
f o r  your  a s s i s t a n c e .
S ince re ly ,
Daniel G. Kyle, CPA




P le as e  send me a summary copy of the r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  s tudy.
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Solid Haste Collection Report 
Explanation of T e n s
A brief explanation of selected terms used in the enclosed Residential Solid 
Haste Collection (hereafter RSWC) Report is provided below so that the 
information reported will be comparable. Please do not return this page.
Accrual Basis of Accounting— revenues are recorded when earned and expenditures 
(or expenses) are recorded in the period in which they are incurred.
Cash Basis of Accounting— revenues are recorded when cash is received and 
expenditures are recorded when cash paid out.
Capital Outlays— expenditures for purchase and replacement of equipment, purchase 
of land and existing structures, and construction.
Contract Out— when a local government hires and pays a private firm or other 
government unit (e.g., parish) to collect residential solid w a s t e .
General Obligation Bonded Indebtedness— the amount of general obligation bonded 
indebtedness outstanding at fiscal year end that is subject to the GOB debt limit 
(see GOB Debt Limit below).
GOB Debt Limit— the maximum amount of general obligation debt outstanding 
allowable for your municipality under Louisiana State Law.
Intergovernmental Revenues— includes grants, entitlements, and shared revenues 
from all sources (i.e., federal, state, p ar ish); exclude your share of a parish 
general sales tax as this should be reported as part of sales tax revenues.
Modified Accrual Basis of Accounting— revenues are recorded in the period in 
which they become measurable and available, and expenditures are recorded at the 
time a liability is incurred.
Payroll Expenditures— w a g e s , salaries and related fringe benefit costs.
Residential Solid Haste— discarded solid materials originating in residences
(i.e., household garbage, household refuse).
Revenues— do not include bond proceeds and/or operating transfers.
RSU— residential solid waste.
RSHC— residential solid waste collection.
Sales Tax Revenues— include your share of a parish general sales tax.
Total RSHC Expenditures— includes salaries and wages of RSWC employees; fringe 
benefit costs for RSWC employees; operation and maintenance of RSWC vehicles; 
depreciation on RSWC vehicles; landfill fees; the portion of supervisors, clerks 
and other support workers which can properly be attributed to RSWC; and that 
portion of overhead expenditures that can be properly attributed to RSWC. 
Municipalities that contract out RSWC should report the amount paid to the parish 
and/or private firm for RSHC.
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usnnrui solid iasti cohictioi upoit
Please type or print the sue, title, ltd phone nuiber of the person eoipletinj this report:
Sue:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Title:_ _ _ _ _ _ _  ■_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   Phots lusher:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
fart 1: Geieral Isfomtioi
Please ote the lost recent data available to answer the following pestiens. ill itess relate to your sncicipality.
1. Sue of innicipality _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  2. Popclitioc of innicipality _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
!. lather of households _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  4. Total laid area (square tiles) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
5. Total assessed valuation I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  6. Property tax rate (tills) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
7. Coihited pariih/eity tales tax rate_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ % 6. City sales tax rate ____ _
S. lather of satieiptl eaployees _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  10. lather of 1SIC eiployees  ,_ _ _ _ _ _
11. lather of taticipal eiployees 12. lest current bond ratios .____________
it collective bargaining otits _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   Moody's or Standard IPoor's (please circle ote)
13. Does the taticipality collect a user fee froi residents for is*:? (please circle appropriate response) US 10
14. If t uer fee is collected, it is hilled: (please check appropriate response)
 As a separate itei on the tax bill
  As a separate itei on a utility (e.g., water, sewer, etc.) hill
 Separately froi all other hills
 Other (please describe) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
15. Ihich of the following foods do you use to account for isv: revenues i expenditures? (please chech appropriate response)
 General fond
 Enterprise fond
 Other fond (please describe),______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .____
IS. that basis of accounting is osed for 1SVC revenues S expenditures? (please check appropriate response)
 Accrual basis
 Modified accrual basis
 Cash basis
17. Ihich of the following in: irrangeients is (are) used in your innicipality? (please chech appropriate response(s);
 lonicipal eiployees collect ts»
 Private sector eiployees collect ESI (innicipality contracts either directly or via parish governient)
Parish governient eiployees collect isv (innicipality contracts with parish governient)
 Citizens hire private haulers or dispose of solid waste theiselves
 Other (please describe)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
II. If 1ST is contracted out, please provide the naie of the parish and/or private firs, and the year in 
which contracting ont vas initiated:
lirish/lin_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _        Tear
Put II: Kxpuii tires
Pleise ne tbe list recent ratal de'.i available to etsier tbe Icllovisg goestiots. 
I u  «:t; ills iroi tbe 12 lottb period ending: Bof.b_ ______ leer__
If. total expendittres
(ill govertiental iotd types) l_
21. total expettei
(ill proFtietiry food types) J.
22. tetal piyroll (ill uplcyees; I.
25. Central obligation bonded
indtbiedness (it iissil yet: etd)l_
2D.. total general hid expenditures 
erclidinc cepitil ontleys
22. total 15VC expendittres 
U S M l i  capital ontleys
24. foul isv: piyroll
24. COE debt liiit
Pert III: lemies
Please tse tbe tost recent mneal dete available to ansver tbe iollcirin; gtestions
1 ib isirg diti froi tbe 12 lottb period ending: Knntb_______ Tear__
27. Util property tu revenoes I______ _ _ _ _ _
2S. total teles tu revtnces I.
31. Otber tu revenoes l_
33. total tu mantes S.
35. leTisnes froi isv: ise: fees |_
2E. lntergoverniental revenues 
(111 gcvemientel find types)
3D. total metces
(ill govertientil food types)
32. Inttigovtrtienlil revenots 
(ill proprietary find types)
34. total remnes
(ill proprietary find types)
3E. total general food mecoes
Pert IV: Put (tunes 
37. IftC sales tu revenoes I.
Part V: idditional lifonation
Please provide tbe folloviog icfcrestioi if available.
31. ISV Is collected it tbe (please circle] COU IUIT litlOOOt
39. ire residents renlred to cse plastic or paper bag: is gerbege containers (u opposed to girbege cans)?
40. Pregnancy of ISVC (ember of picl*cps per wet): ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
41. tbe tuiici iciber of cootaioers tbit i bonsebold eay pot oot per collection is:
n u i  too tot ton coonutioi u  com m it m s upon
VITA
RICHARD C. BROOKS 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803
EDUCATION
PhD in Accounting with Minor in Economics, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, May 1991.
MA in Teaching, Montclair State College, Upper
Montclair, New Jersey, May 1985, with New Jersey 
Certification to teach accounting, data processing, 
general business, and mathematics.
BS in Business Administration, Montclair State College, 
Upper Montclair, New Jersey, May 1981, cum laude.
INSTRUCTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Teaching
Teaching Assistant, Louisiana State University, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, January 1987 to May 1991. 
Managerial Accounting.
Instructor, William Paterson College, Wayne, New Jersey, 
summer session 1989. Managerial Accounting.
Instructor, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New 
Jersey, summer session 1988. Accounting Principles 
II.
Other
Coordinator-Managerial Accounting, Louisiana State
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